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THE FALLACY THAT FAIR USE AND
INFORMATION SHOULD BE
PROVIDED FOR FREE: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE
RESPONSES TO THE DMCA'S SECTION 1201
Mauricio Espafia*
INTRODUCTION
The Framers of the Constitution believed that the advancement
of the arts and technology were very important to the growth of
society.1 Thus, in 1787, they adopted the Copyright Clause to the
Constitution to give Congress the power to enact copyright regula-
tions in order "[to] Promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts."'2 Both the copyright and the scientific world in which fram-
ers lived, however, has changed dramatically. Likewise, the Copy-
right Act has evolved and adapted to changes in technology and
society.3
It should surprise no one that at the end of the twentieth century
Congress has once more revised the Copyright Act.' During the
latter end of the twentieth century, the world encountered the most
drastic change in our way of life since the industrial revolution.
This change was brought about by the emergence of the digital
revolution, more specifically, digital information, computer net-
works, and the Web.' This novel and innovative technology now
permeates every aspect of peoples' lives including copyrighted
works, and has provided enormous benefits in terms of conve-
nience, productivity, and quality. Moreover, because digital tech-
nology is fast evolving and revolutionary, the potential benefits to
every aspect of peoples' lives are immeasurable.
* J.D. 2003, Fordham University School of Law; Associate, Mayer, Brown,
Rowe & Maw (as of September 2003). I would like to thank everyone who supported
and encouraged me as I strived to carry on my endeavors. I would like to express
special gratitude to my mother, father, family, and friends for their unending support,
tolerance, and understanding.
1. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 19 (2001).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. Infra Part I.C.1.
4. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified as scattered sections of 17 U.S.C).
5. Infra Part I.C.2.a-c (discussing digital information, computer networks, and
the Web).
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The same characteristics that make digital technology and digital
copyrighted works beneficial, however, also contribute to their sus-
ceptibleness to piracy and unauthorized exploitation.6 This danger
to copyrighted works has the potential of regressing the advance-
ment and progress of science and the arts, and adversely affecting
the affluent copyright and e-commerce industries that have devel-
oped.7 The potential for this calamity was recognized by the. one
hundred and sixty nations, including the United States, that partici-
pated in the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"),8
which convened to amend the Berne Convention,9 the interna-
tional copyright treaty that the United States adheres to, in order
to recognize copyrights in digital works.10
These nations were well aware of the effect that piracy and unau-
thorized exploitation would have on copyrighted works if they did
not protect them.1 Accordingly, they signed and ratified two trea-
ties aimed at protecting copyrighted works by prohibiting the cir-
cumvention and creation of tools made for the purpose of
circumventing Technological Protective Measures implemented by
copyright owners to protect their works.12
In 1998, the United States, a signing member of the WIPO trea-
ties enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") 13 in
order to bring "copyright law squarely into the digital age."' 4 Its
relevant and most controversial section is Title One, "WIPO Trea-
ties Implementation," which contains 17 U.S.C. § 1201.15 Section
1201 implements the WIPO treaties by prohibiting the circumven-
tion and creation of tools to circumvent copyright owners' Techno-
logical Protective Measures. 6
Legal commentators did not welcome the implementation of the
WIPO treaties through § 1201.'7 These commentators claim that
6. Infra Part I.C.2.d.
7. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 8-9 (1998).
8. Infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
9. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 35-40.
10. Id. at 47-49.
11. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 4-5.
12. JoYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 48.
13. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as scattered sections of 17
U.S.C).
14. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2.
15. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 101, 112 Stat. 2860, 2861 (codified as scattered sections of
17 U.S.C).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2001).
17. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory
Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 742-46 (2001)
[hereinafter Bell, Escape from Copyright] (arguing that Copyright law provides copy-
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§ 1201 will have the adverse effect of hindering or abolishing both
fair use," and the copyright balance, by creating a "pay-per-use"
world where the public will have to pay for all uses of copyrighted
works, including fair use.19
This Note argues that § 1201 is not only necessary to ensure that
copyright law is able to progress and advance in the digital revolu-
tion, but more importantly, that the protection of copyrighted
works will benefit the public in ways the analog20 world cannot. It
also argues that legal commentators' fears about § 1201 are
misplaced.
The real danger to fair use and the copyright balance stems from
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws' ("NCCUSL") adoption of the Uniform Computer Informa-
tion Transactions Act ("UCITA"). 21  UCITA's danger emanates
from its two main effects.22 First, its provisions provide copyright
owners with the ability to condition the licensing of all copyrighted
works on any terms, including the forfeiture of fair use and other
right owners with too much protection); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common
Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 354, 359-60 (1999) [hereinafter Benkler, Common Use] (arguing that the DMCA
may be too restrictive); Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the
Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52
FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 562-63 (2000) [hereinafter Benkler, Consumers to User] (argu-
ing that the DMCA may be detrimental to users and creators of copyrighted works);
Julie Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws Designed
to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 161, 163 (1997) (arguing that the enactment
of the DMCA would foreclose uses that copyright law expressly permits); Neil Wein-
stock Netanel, Copyright and Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 289-90
(1996) (discussing copyright's importance in maintaining and furthering a democratic
civil society); David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 712-15 (2000) (arguing that the DMCA may bring forth a
"pay-per-use" society); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Econ-
omy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 519, 522-24 (1999) (arguing that the DMCA's anti-circumvention provi-
sions are too broad and achieved an imbalance in copyright law).
18. § 107; infra Part II.A.1, 3.
19. Nimmer, supra note 17, at 710-28; Samuelson, supra note 17, at 542-43; see also
Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights
Challenge us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137, 148-49
(1997) (discussing paying for the use of works in a library setting).
20. By "analog" I refer to all traditional copyrighted works that have not been
digitized, including, but not limited to books, magazines, newspapers, and audio tapes.
21. Unif. Computer Info. Transaction Act (Final Act Aug. 2002), available at http:/
/www.law.upenn.edu/bl/ulc/ulc frame.htm (last visited May 6, 2003); infra notes 169-
174 and accompanying text.
22. Infra Part II.B.2.
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privileges and rights.23 Second, they validate and enforce ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg's24 "shrink-wrap" contracts. 25
Part I of this Note discusses copyright's background, including
the genesis of copyright law, the evolution of copyright law includ-
ing the DMCA,26 and ProCD, InC.27 and its progeny.
Part II explores the controversy and debate within the legal com-
munity regarding the implications of the DMCA's § 1201.28 First,
Section A explores the arguments in opposition to § 1201, includ-
ing the unbalanced pay-per-use world argument, the First Amend-
ment/democratic paradigm argument, and the market failure
theory argument. Section B then elucidates the main argument
from commentators supporting § 1201. Section C discusses the ar-
gument that UCITA stands to adversely affect fair use and the cop-
yright balance.
Finally, Part III argues that § 1201 is not only necessary and ben-
eficial, but also does not adversely affect fair use and the copyright
balance.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Genesis of Copyright Law
The genesis of Anglo-American copyright law was motivated by
a desire to censor divergent views, but in effect, the English Crown
provided an exclusive publishing monopoly.29 Its impetus, how-
ever, eventually became the protection of authors' works. 30 The
first copyright regulation, the Statute of Anne, enacted in England
in 1710, provided authors with limited protection for their works. 3'
23. Unif. Computer Info. Transaction Act § 208.
24. 908 F. Supp. 640, 644 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
25. Unif. Computer Info. Transaction Act §§ 112, 208, 211.
26. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as scattered sections of 17
U.S.C).
27. 908 F. Supp. at 644.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2001).
29. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 16. In 1534, England imposed the first Anglo
regulation of copyrights after the introduction of the printing press by William Caxton
threatened the Crown's power and religious views. Id. at 15-16. The English Crown
"prohibited anyone from publishing without a license and approval by official cen-
sors." Id. at 16. In 1557, they went further and gave a publishing group, Stationer's
Company, an exclusive publishing monopoly. Id.
30. Netanel, supra note 17, at 354-57 (discussing copyright's importance in main-
taining and furthering a democratic civil society). Professor Netanel claims that this
conversion of motivation was promulgated by the Framer's belief that protection of
author's works would provide them with an incentive to create and disseminate,
which were vital and essential to democratic governance. Id. at 356-59.
31. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 16.
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Parliament enacted this Act to further the "encouragement of
learning, "32 and to encourage "Learned Men to Compose and
Write useful Books.
33
In 1787, after the majority of the American states had enacted
copyright laws, the Framers of the Constitution adopted the Copy-
right Clause, providing the federal government with the right to
pass laws on copyright in order to create a uniform regulation.34
As evident from the clause's language, the Framers, like Parlia-
ment before them, intended to further science and learning by pro-
viding authors and inventors with an economic incentive. Three
years later, Congress used its constitutional empowerment to enact
the Copyright Act of 1790 protecting maps, charts, and books for a
period of twenty-eight years. 6 As America encountered changes
in technology and market forces, however, Congress repeatedly ex-
ercised its power to amend and revise the Copyright Act.37
B. The Creation of Fair Use and the Copyright Balance
Although copyright law provides copyright holders with broad
and powerful monopoly rights as an incentive to create, allowing
these rights to be absolute and unhindered would destroy the bal-
ance between the private and public interests of copyright law.38
Accordingly, to maintain this balance, Congress included many
limitations to copyright owners' exclusive rights.39 Although Con-
gress enacted many such limitations by statute, most are categori-
cal and limit a judge's role to that of determining whether an action
fits within any of the enumerated exceptions.40 These limitations
alone, however, are insufficient to balance copyright law's public
32. Id.
33. Id. at 18 (quoting the language of the Statute of Anne).
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (stating that "Congress shall have the Power...
To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times, to
Authors and Inventors, the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies."). At the time of its adoption, twelve out of the thirteen states had their own
different copyright regulations. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 19.
35. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 19.
36. Id. at 20.
37. Infra Part I.C.1.
38. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text (discussing the creation of copy-
right laws that would both provide an economic incentive for authors to create while
also allowing other creators to use these works to further create).
39. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-21 (2001). These sections describe in intricate detail the limi-
tations to copyright owner's exclusive rights enumerated in 17 U.S.C. § 106.
40. Id.
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and private interests41 because there has and will be many in-
stances not specifically enumerated by Congress where reason and
fairness shall dictate that a specific use of a copyrighted work can-
not be considered a copyright infringement, while simultaneously
being consistent with the Copyright Clause's purpose and man-
date.42 Accordingly, courts have developed the doctrine of "fair
use" a judge made equitable rule of reason that attempts to fill the
gap between copyright's public interest in providing authors with
an incentive and the Constitution's private interest in promoting
"the Progress of Science and useful Arts. '43 The ultimate test of
fair use is whether "the Copyright Act's goals of encouraging crea-
tive and original work would be better served by allowing the use
than by preventing it."' 44 Due to its flexible nature and dual func-
tion as bridge and safety valve-which allows courts to use it when
they deem fairness requires-fair use's major problem and benefit
has been its inconsistency and indeterminacy.45
In 1976, Congress acknowledged fair use's significance and codi-
fied it as section 107 in the 1976 Copyright Act. 46 Congress' inten-
tion was merely to restate the common law doctrine, by neither
changing, narrowing, or enlarging it, so as to leave courts "free to
41. SHELDON W. HALPERN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF UNITED STATES INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COPYRIGHT, PATENT, AND TRADEMARK 112 (1999).
42. Fair use has been used as a judicial equitable doctrine as far back as 1841 to
the present date. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594
(1994) (holding that parody of Roy Orbison's song by 2 Live Crew may be fair use if it
satisfies all factors); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S.
539, 569 (1985) (holding that under the pertinent factors the unauthorized publication
of plaintiffs work before its publication did not constitute fair use); Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55 (1984) (finding that
home time-shifting through the use of VTRs is permissible is fair use); Holdredge v.
Knight Publishing Corp. 214 F.Supp. 921, 924 (S.D. Cal 1963) (stating that the use of
an author's work as a source for the creation of a new work is considered fair use);
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342, 347-48 (C.C.D. Mass 1841) (discussing whether the
copying of plaintiff's letters belonging to George Washington was a fair use); N.Y.
Tribune Inc. v. Otis & Co., 39 F.Supp. 67, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (discussing whether
defendants duplication and publication of plaintiff's editorial in order to respond to
its content was a copyright infringement or fair use).
43. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 (stating that fair use is necessary to promote
progress of the arts and sciences because there are very few things that are original).
44. Arica Inst. Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1077 (2d Cir. 1992).
45. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 594 (holding that a parody made by rap group 2
Live Crew of Roy Orbison and William Dees's ballad "Oh Pretty Woman" may con-
stitute fair use, but must be determined on the basis of the facts on remand); see also
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, pt.1, at 76 (1976) (stating that "since the doctrine is an equita-
ble rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising
the question must be decided on its own facts").
46. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as 17 U.S.C. § 107).
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adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case ba-
sis. ''47 As a result, although 17 U.S.C. § 107 contains four enumer-
ated factors to determine whether an action constitutes fair use,48
courts have continued to apply fair use inconsistently on a case-by-
case basis, justifying this practice on varying grounds of equity and
fairness.49 Although there are no determinative categories of fair
use, several significant ones have nonetheless developed.50 Of
these categories, fair use of utilitarian works and uses made for
research and academic purposes are most relevant to this Note.51
47. Sony Corp. of America, 464 U.S. at 450; see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577;
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549.
48. Section 107 lists the four categories that courts are to consider in no order of
importance in deciding whether a particular action is considered fair use:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001).
49. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549-50 (discussing the issue of fair use as a
reasonable copyright owner test, basing the determination on whether "a reasonable
copyright owner [would] have consented to the use"); supra note 42 (listing various
fair use cases decided on equitable grounds). Professor Nimmer presents the fair use
issue as one regarding the golden rule breaking down the determination to the simple
axiom "[t]ake not from others to such an extent and in such a manner that you would
be resentful if they took so from you." David Nimmer, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
263, 287 (2003).
50. In addition to the purposes listed in § 107's preamble, "criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research" courts have recognized a fair use interest in parodies, satires, and
burlesques and utilitarian works, most specifically the reverse engineering of com-
puter programs. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579-81; Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,
137 F.3d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 1998); Sega Enterprises Ltd. V. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510, 1520-21 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that reverse engineering of computer programs
under certain circumstances is fair use); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America
Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding "reverse engineering object code to
discern the unprotectable ideas in a computer program is a fair use"); Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 1986).
51. E.g., Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, 99 F.3d 1381,
1383 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that defendant's copying and selling copyrighted works
to students did not constitute fair use); Atari Games Corp., 975 F.2d at 843 (discussing
reverse engineering of computer programs)..
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C. The Evolution of Copyright Law
1. Evolution Caused by Market Failure and
Technological Innovation
From its onset, copyright law was motivated and driven by new
and emerging technologies and modern conditions. As previously
mentioned, Britain and the United States were initially stimulated
to enact copyright regulations to protect authors' works from un-
restricted copying, and to provide them with an economic incentive
to continue creating and disseminating.52 The "Market Failure"
theory best explains this original stimulus; it asserts, "[c]opyright
law arose as a response to the market's failure to protect expressive
works. ' 53 In keeping with its original impetus, at the beginning of
the twentieth century, President Theodore Roosevelt summoned a
complete revision of copyright law, the Copyright Act of 1909, in
order to "meet modern conditions. ' 54  Similarly, the piecemeal
amendments that followed these major revisions were stimulated
by "changing times and technology."55
In 1976, driven by the computer industry's technical revolution,
Congress once again revised copyright law through the Copyright
Act of 1976, which, except for some minor amendments, mirrors
the present copyright scheme.56 The quickly evolving computer
revolution, however, brought forth significant amendments to di-
rectly address technology's affect on copyright law.5 7
52. Supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
53. Bell, Escape from Copyright, supra note 17, at 747.
54. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 20. The 1909 Copyright Act had three major
revisions including: the expansion of subject matter to include, all writing of an au-
thor; the extension of period of copyright protection to a total of fifty six years; and
the commencement of copyright protection was changed from time of registration to
publication. Id.
55. Id. at 21. The two major amendments brought forth by new technologies were
adding the motion picture to the list of subject matter and providing copyright owners
with a right to authorize performance for profit. Id.
56. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as scattered section of 17
U.S.C.). "[T]he 1976 Act was drafted so as to accommodate new media and new
technologies for communicating creative expression;" however it was far from perfect
because it failed to see the affect that new technologies would have on the creation of
new industries and uses. JAY DRATLER, JR., CYBERLAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE DIGITAL MILLENIUM 1-10 (2003).
57. In 1980, § 117 was completely amended to codify the explicit protection and
scope of rights for computer programs. Pub. L. No. 96-517, §10(b), 94 Stat. 3028
(1980) (codified as 17 U.S.C. §117). The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984,
a sui generis form of copyright legislation, was enacted to protect computer chips.
Pub. L. No. 98-620, Title III, § 302, 98 Stat. 3347 (1984) (codified as 17 U.S.C. 901-14).
In 1984, Congress added section b to § 109 to prohibit the direct or indirect commer-
cial renting of phonorecords, sound recordings, and computer programs. Pub. L. No.
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a. Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The most important and controversial amendment to copyright
law, and the main issue of this Note, is the enactment of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.58 This amendment clearly illus-
trates how technological changes and innovations require congres-
sional action. As the Senate report presented by Senator Orrin G.
Hatch states, the DMCA's purpose is to "facilitate the robust de-
velopment and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce,
communications, research, development, and education."59 Before
a thorough explanation of the DMCA's provisions is provided,
60 it
is important to first understand and appreciate the digital technol-
ogy, including its advantages and disadvantages, that encouraged
the enactment of this legislation.
2. The Advent of the Digital World and Its Affect on
Copyright Law
Although digital technology is prevalent in almost every aspect
of society,61 in intellectual property law it is predominant in the
sphere known as the National Information Infrastructure ("NII")
or the information superhighway.62 The NII is composed of many
98-450, § 2, 98 Stat. 1727 (1984) (codified as 17 U.S.C. §109(b)). In 1988, § 119 was
added to provide a compulsory license for home satellite viewing. Pub. L. No. 100-
667, Title II, § 202(2), 102 Stat. 3949 (1988) (codified as 17 U.S.C. §119). Although
there are many more amendments to illustrate technology's affect on copyright law,
the most relevant to this issue is, first, the Digital Performance Right in Sound Re-
cordings Act of 1995, which created a sixth exclusive right for copyright owners, the
right to perform publicly a sound recording by means of a "digital" transmission.
Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 2, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) (codified as 17 U.S.C. §106(6)). Sec-
ondly, the No Electronic Theft Act ("NET"), passed in 1997, significantly revised the
copyright infringement provisions by providing criminal liabilities for the free distribu-
tion of copyrighted works. Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified at
amended in 17 U.S.C. §506).
58. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
59. S. REP. 105-190, at 1 (1998).
60. Infra Part I.C.4.
61. Hologic Receives Final FDA Approval for Its Lorad(R) Full Field Digital
Mammography System, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 19, 2002, at Financial Section (discussing
the benefits that digital technology can have on improvements on mammography test-
ing); Karen Lowry Miller & Anna Kuchment, The Shock of Recovery, NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 4, 2002, at 38 (discussing within the context of the World Economic Forum how
digital technology will improve and benefit the economy).
62. HENRY H. PERRIT, JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 13
(2001); COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING INFO. STRUC-
TURE & COMPUTER SCI. AND TELECOMM. BD.: COMM'N ON PHYSICAL SC., MATHE-
MATICS, AND APPLICATIONS NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA:
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elements,6 3 but the three major ones are digital information, com-
puter networks, and the World Wide Web.64
a. Digital Information
Digital information is all encompassing, covering everything
from audio, text, video, computer software, and shape.65 In addi-
tion, the way digital computers and users utilize this information
creates vital implications for copyright law.66 Unlike analog infor-
mation, using digital information in most instances requires copy-
ing of the information.67 This implicates copyright law by
triggering copyright owners' exclusive reproduction right.68
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 2 (2000) [hereinafter THE DIGI-
TAL DILEMMA].
63. The National Information Infrastructure is composed of many structures, such
as wireless technologies, cellular phones, personal communication systems, satellite
systems, and all forms of electronic publishing. PERRIT, supra note 62, at 13-14.
64. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 2. The Internet and World Wide
Web are not to be confused as the same entity. Id. at 39. The Internet is a massive
networking hub. See id. (describing the World Wide Web as a giant bulleting board).
It is an open architecture that is non-proprietary, that is, it is not owned or controlled
by anyone. See id. at 263-65 (discussing the way the Web works). Thus, anyone who
conforms to its standards of TCP/IP protocols may connect to this network. Id. The
World Wide Web, on the other hand, is the most popular use of the Internet. The
World Wide Web is one way of organizing information so that it can be distributed
across the Internet by creating html documents that can be viewed and accessed by
browsers, such as Netscape and Internet Explorer. Id. at 39.
65. Id. at 28.
66. Id. at 28-45.
67. Unlike reading a book, a magazine, or going through a directory, accessing
digital information using a computer requires that the computer make one or more
copies of the information. Id. at 28, 31. These copies are made either from a website,
server, or computer program into the computer's temporary Random Access Memory
("RAM"), so that when the user desires to use or see certain things the computer
directs the information from RAM to the computer screen. See id. (discussing how
information is copied into a computer's memory in order to perform any functions).
Since RAM is temporary, it is often deleted when the computer shuts down, but ab-
sent any protection, it can be saved before shutting down. See id.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2001). The right to reproduce is the most basic and broadly
defined right. HALPERN ET AL., supra note 41, at 104-11. It is infringed by merely
making any copy or phonorecord of a copyrighted work. Id. The Copyright Act,
when defining "copy" and "phonorecords" makes it clear that the machine, process,
or medium used to make a reproduction is irrelevant. See, e.g., § 117; MAI Systems
Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517-18 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that copy-
ing an operating system into a computer Random Access Memory, constitutes a
"copy" of the program for purpose of copyright infringement). Although Congress
intended to make this right broad and exclusive, it did not intend it to be absolute,
because there are various statutory limitations and exceptions that are the focal point
of this discussion. § 106. This raises the issue of whether rights to control distribution
may restrict rights to access. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 31.
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Digital information's physical and economic characteristics have
the most significant impact on copyright law.69 Digitally encoded
information can be fixed in a compact form: this information is eas-
ily transferable or distributable since it is not restricted to any me-
dium.7° Most importantly, users can copy the information quickly
and inexpensively. 71 "Consequently, the traditional physical and
economic impediments to copyright infringement have been con-
siderably undermined. '7 2 For instance, the ability to reproduce un-
limited numbers of original-quality copies of digital information
removes the most vital traditional hindrance to copyright infringe-
ment, the imperfection of reproductions.73
Finally, since digital information is very flexible and dynamic, it
can be easily manipulated and incorporated into other works. 4
This characteristic supports the creation of indexes and search fea-
tures within works, which provide an extremely beneficial and effi-
cient tool for research and study.75 This flexibility, however, also
lends to the easy creation of derivative works, either new copy-
righted works or infringements of pre-existing works.76
69. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 32-33.
70. Id. at 32.
71. Id. at 31-32; see also Real Networks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *4, *13 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000) (contrasting
streaming with downloading by referring to the latter's ability to provide the user with
a copy that can be distributed to others). Unlike analog information, digital informa-
tion can be stored in pocket size floppy disks, zip disks, or CDs that are capable of
storing hundreds of thousands of text and can be purchased relatively cheaply. THE
DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 31-32.
72. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 32; Netanel, supra note 17, at 285;
see also Real Networks, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *13 (finding that digital
content poses greater dangers from unauthorized exploitation because of its physical
characteristics).
73. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 32; Michael J. Madison, Legal Ware:
Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1036-38 (1998)
(discussing the effect digital technology has on copyright owner's fight to prevent
piracy and how UCC-2B may adversely affect fair use and other user rights).
74. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 33-34.
75. Id.
76. Id. A derivative work is the creation of an "independently copyrightable"
work made by recasting, transforming, or adapting a pre-existing copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. §103(b) (2001); Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978, 990 (2d Cir. 1995). De-
rivative works serve a twofold function they either can be a new copyrighted expres-
sion or infringement of a pre-existing copyright. In serving the former function
derivative works must satisfy both the fixation and originality requirements to be
copyrighted. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 968
(9th Cir. 1992). In its latter function, the creation of a derivative work may constitute
infringement without being fixed to a tangible medium. See id. (carrying out the fair
use analysis to determine if the Game Genie infringed plaintiff's copyright even
though they determined that it was not fixed to constitute a derivative worked). It is
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b. Computer Networks
A computer network is a group of interconnected computers ei-
ther closely situated, or located as far away as across the world.77
These computers can share the same software and hardware, but
most importantly, they have the ability to quickly transfer files be-
tween each other.78 This ability to distribute digital information
almost instantly around the world is beneficial to many businesses
and industries,7 9 but also presents copyright implications by the un-
authorized widespread distribution of copyrighted works.80 More-
over, it prevents the enforcement of legal restraining or injunctive
orders and similar tools, which become useless once the informa-
tion is disseminated.81
c. World Wide Web
The World Wide Web ("Web") is a relatively free global medium
of publication that allows its users to publish works through stan-
dard protocols and allows access to these works through special
programs.8 2 The Web is not limited to any medium, allowing video,
text, graphics, or audio to be uploaded, published, and accessed.83
It also allows hyperlinking, through which users can connect their
important to keep in mind that copyright does not give the creator of a derivative
work monopoly power over any pre-existing works. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). Copyright's
monopoly power extends only to the extent of the originality and creativity applied.
Id.
77. PERRIT, supra note 62, at 5.
78. See THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 38-39 (discussing the technicali-
ties and workings of computer networks). "Networked storage of digital information
has vastly reduced the cost of locating, retrieving, and accessing large quantities of
information." Madison, supra note 73, at 1061.
79. Supra note 61.
80. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 38-39; see also A&M Records Inc. v.
Napster Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding a temporary injunction
based on a finding that Napster would likely be held liable for contributory infringe-
ment because it allowed the transfer and copies of copyrighted MP3 music files).
Copyright law provides copyright holders with the right to distribute their work in any
manner, either through sale or otherwise. § 106(3). This right is analogous to the
common law right of first publication, which gave copyright holders the right to deter-
mine when their work would first be exposed to the public. Harper & Row Publish-
ers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 553 (1985). Although all exclusive rights
granted by copyright law are mutually exclusive, exclusivity is of most importance
with regards to the right to distribute. HALPERN ET AL., supra note 41, at 78. For
instance, authorization to reproduce a work or perform it publicly does not give an
individual the right to distribute it.
81. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 38-39
82. Supra note 64.
83. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 39-42.
FAIR USE AND INFORMATION
publication to other publications through the Web.84 This "World-
wide Publishing Medium" provides many benefits to users, such as
free access to an enormous amount of information, which can be
easily searched and identified with search engines.85 The Web also
makes it easier for individuals to publish their works without the
use of publishers. 6 Finally, it provides users and businesses with
an extra medium of advertising and commerce, which in the last
decade has provided the economy with a tremendous source of in-
come, and has driven legislators to provide protections and incen-
tives to individuals desiring to post their material on the Web.87
The Web's magnitude and the ease with which one can publish
on it, however, yields some negative consequences.88 For instance,
since publication on the Web is easy and inexpensive, unauthorized
distribution and reproduction of posted material becomes almost
impossible to control or prevent. 89 This is a major problem for
publishers who use the Web as an alternative or even their sole
medium of publication, and for copyright owners whose works are
published without permission or compensation °
84. Id. at 39.
85. Id. at 39-40; PERRIT, supra note 62, at 12-13. A search engine is a "computer
software used to search data (as text or a database) for specified information." MER-
RIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, available at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-
bin/dictionary (last visited Mar 21, 2003).
86. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 40-41. The most successful example
of this factor is Stephen King's publishing of his book, "Riding the Bullet", on the
Web instead of with publishers. Oscar Musibay, E-books: A Real LCD Turner, HisP.,
Oct 2001, at 58, available at http://www.hispaniconline.com/magazine/2001/oct/Tech-
nology/ (May 6, 2003). On its first day, it sold over 500,000 copies, and paid him
disproportionately higher than a traditional publisher. Id. Even everyday people,
however, who have been unable to convince traditional publishers to publish their
works can now, for the small price of $399 through companies such as 1st Books
Library, publish their own works and receive a percent royalty for each copy sold.
David Mehegan, You've Got the Book with a Growing New Technology, Anyone Who
Writes a Manuscript Can Become a Published Author, BOSTON GLOBE, Jul. 4, 2001, at
C1 (discussing the growing trend of authors self-publishing on the Web).
87. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 40-42. Politicians and legal com-
mentators alike have recognized the importance of the Web and E-Commerce to the
United States economy. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SECRETARIAT ON ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE, THE EMERGING DIGITAL ECONOMY 1 (1998) (recognizing the impact
that the Information Technology and E-Commerce sector has and will have on the
U.S. economy and desires to make sure that the U.S.'s laws and regulations ensure
that it is a positive impact); Samuelson, supra note 17, at 525-26 (discussing the
problems with the DMCA's anti-circumvention regulations, but recognizing the im-
portance of e-commerce).
88. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 40-42.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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d. Copyright Owners' Options to Protect Their Works
Although digital technology provides users with benefits and ser-
vices not available through traditional media, it also makes copy-
righted works more susceptible to unauthorized exploitation and
mutilation. Accordingly, copyright owners must use Technical Pro-
tection Measures ("TPMs")91 to protect any work published and
distributed via the Web or in a digital medium.92 Although the
TPMs industry is fast evolving and dynamic, four systems consist-
ently play a major role.
i. Encryption
Cryptography, the science of encryption,93 is the most popular
and basic form of TPM. 94 The cryptographic method of protection
uses encryption of a work's content so that it cannot be reasonably
discernable until decrypted. 95 Presently, there are two major forms
of encryption: symmetric-key encryption and public-key encryp-
tion.96 Symmetric-key encryption uses a single key, for instance
Key A, to both encrypt and decrypt information.97 Thus, a copy-
right owner encrypts his work with Key A and publishes his work
on the Web, discernable only to those who are authorized to view
the work by purchasing, licensing, or otherwise obtaining Key A
from the copyright owner.98 A major problem, however, with sym-
metric-key encryption is that Key A must be sent to authorized
users so that they may decrypt it, which leaves open the possibility
of interception of the keys.99
91. This term refers to any technology that is used to protect copyrighted. I have
chosen this term because a measure is a step taken or plan as a means to an end,
which is a copyright owner's intention. This technology, however, has been referred
throughout academia in many different ways, including Technical Protection Measure,
Technical Protection Systems, Copyright Management Systems, and Automated
Rights Management. Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated
Rights Management On Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 562
(1998) (using the term Automated Rights Management); Cohen, supra note 17, at 161
(using the term Copyright Management Systems); Nimmer, supra note 17, at 686 (us-
ing the term Technical Protection Measures); Samuelson, supra note 17, at 524 (using
the term Technical Protection Systems).
92. Real Networks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1889, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
93. Encrypt means to scramble and decrypt refers to descrambling. THE DIGITAL
DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 156.
94. Id. at 155.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 156-58.
97. Id. at 156.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 156-57.
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Public-key cryptography uses two separate keys; a public-key
and a private-key that together create a unique combination. 100
The public key is used to encrypt the work, but unlike symmetric-
key encryption, it cannot decrypt it. 10' Its counterpart, the private-
key is used solely to decrypt the content.10 2 Individuals usually im-
plement this measure by keeping the private-key and publishing
the public-key so that anyone can use the public key to encrypt a
communication between them, but enabling only the holder of the
private key to discern it by decrypting it.'0 3 Many intellectual
property owners encrypt their information content by combining
both forms of cryptography.I0 4 For instance, a copyrighted work is
encrypted using a symmetric-key, and the public-key is then used
to send the same symmetric-key encryption to authorized users
who already have the private-key."0 5
Cryptography, however, is not perfect and requires careful plan-
ning and structuring to implement it successfully. 0 6 Among the
different risks are circumvention, interception during distribution,
or inadequate planning.10 7
ii. Digital Rights Language
Since the inception of computer programs copyright owners
have used another basic form of TPM, controlling access.10 8 Indus-
tries, however, have recently been developing Digital Rights Lan-
guages ("DRLs"), 109 which are computer programs coded with all
100. Id. at 157.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 157-58.
107. Id. at 157-58. Circumvention is the most relevant to this Note. It would entail
breaking the encryption keys by using mathematical computations to discern the cor-
rect key to decrypt the copyrighted work. Id. at 157-58. Interception entails ob-
taining unauthorized access to the decrypting key either through technological means
such as wire tapping or through social engineering, convincing someone that has the
key to provide it to them. Id. Inadequate planning mainly refers to ensuring that no
trace of the copyrighted content or encryption keys are left in a location that is not
protected, for instance in a computers RAM or temporary files. Id.
108. Controlling access has always been a task of any digital copyright owner
through the simple tasks of requiring passwords and making sure that everyone using
the works is identified. Id. at 158. The Web, however, raised the dichotomy of access/
use because, unlike in small environments such as libraries and universities, once pub-
lished on the Web there is no way to control the use of the work. Id.
109. DRLs are also commonly referred to as "rights management languages"
(RML) and have been developed and are in the process of further development by
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the conditions and rights that are attributable to a specific copy-
righted work. 110 Depending on the type of work DRLs require dif-
ferent conditions for different uses.'11 Therefore, a work is
published on the Web with the DRL, and a consumer has to inform
the program what work it desires and for what use." 2 The program
then matches the work and use with its specific conditions.1 13 Once
the consumer satisfies the conditions, it provides a DRL formatted
work that allows the consumer to use the work only for the speci-
fied and allowed purposes. 11 4
Like all TPMs, however, DRLs are not impenetrable because
they require distribution to each individual's computer and output
devices. 115 Hence, DRLs must also rely on cryptography to protect
them from being intercepted and circumvented." 6
industries such as Folio, NetRights, Xerox, Wave Systems, Intertrust, IBM, AT&T,
and Liquid Audio. Id. at 164; Stefik, supra note 19, at 140-41 (discussing copyright
owner's various options and claims that the protective technological measures will
benefit all). Mark Stefik has actually led the development of a computer program
that may become the standard in DRLs, called ContentGuard, available at http://
www.parc.xerox.com/istl/members/stefik/ (last visited Mar 21, 2003).
110. All the conditions and rights would include the right to display, print, copy,
share, download, and even reuse the work. Stefik, supra note 19, at 149-54. The right
to reuse the work would, for instance, be when an individual desired to use a certain
work, or parts of the work, for a compilation, database, or derivative work; he would
notify the program explicitly what he desired to use it for and the program would then
provide the portion needed for that specific use. Id. Since all the rights are based on
specific conditions it would be possible to have a certain price for each specific use.
Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 161-64. In most instances, the DRL
formatted work must be distributed to a user's computer so that he may use it, which
provides other individuals with the ability to exploit it. Id. Accordingly, these same
industries have been experimenting with different levels of protection that would try
to plant the digital work into that particular computer for the use defined. Id. These
uses include creating programs that would destroy the work upon the attempt to cir-
cumvent it or decrypt it without the proper key, or further conditioning it on a partic-
ular permanent aspect of a user's computer such as their hard drive's serial number.
Id. Regardless, however, of what protections are implemented, the works would
eventually have to go through an output, either a monitor or audio device, by which
individuals could copy the work by either a screen capture utility or an analog to
digital converter. Id. Although possible, this process is very tedious, burdensome and
time consuming, which copyright owners hope will deter potential infringers. Id.
116. Supra notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
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iii. Marking and Monitoring
In many instances, usually involving small closed communities,
such as an office or small institution, encryption is not available or
is impracticable; therefore, the only way to protect copyrighted
works is to deter infringement by providing content of inferior
quality and making detection easy." 7 One simple TPM used to ac-
complish this goal is publishing a work that yields an inferior copy
when reproduced, while providing the superior copy for a fee."'
Once an individual obtains the superior version, however, without
encryption, it becomes very easy for her to reproduce it."19
Accordingly, another marking TPM that copyright owners use is
overtly "labeling" a digital work with their copyright management
information 2 ° and listing what uses are allowed.' Although this
TPM furthers cooperative transactions between individuals be-
cause users are notified of what they are entitled to and whom to
contact for further rights, it only works for honest individuals be-
cause the label can be easily removed. 22
Finally, the last marking TPM is "watermarking," a digital signal
that is used "as a social warning, to carry information, and to leave
digital fingerprints for detecting and tracing unauthorized copy-
ing."' 23 It differs from labeling in that although it can be imple-
mented at different levels, it is not easily visible.124 Watermarking
117. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 164-65.
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text (discussing digital information's
susceptibility to piracy and exploitation).
120. Copyright management information refers to information regarding the copy-
righted works including the title, the owner, the author, and any other pertinent infor-
mation. 17 U.S.C § 1202(c) (2001).
121. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 165.
122. This notion assumes that individuals that intend to use raw materials they ob-
tain from the web or otherwise desire to provide credit and payment where it is due.
Since, however, the label can easily be removed by editing programs such as paint-
brush or adobe photoshop most individuals will remove the label and make use of it.
Id.
123. Stefik, supra note 19, at 142-44. Water marking is a tool that has been used for
centuries in a primitive form. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 165 n.16. For
instance, mapmakers would insert fictitious streets and roads in order to detect unau-
thorized copying. Id. Another example is the insertion of fictitious numbers in phone
directories. Feist Publ'ns., Inc. V. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991).
124. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 166-67, 296-97. Water marking can
be done in various ways either throughout the work or only on certain portions. Id.
It can be "fragile" easily distorted by alterations or "robust," which survives distor-
tions and major revisions. Id. The process can be done by either inserting extra text
or small dots that alone mean nothing, but together provide a discernable mark. Id.
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is predominantly used to detect works that authors have published
or others altered without authorization.125
Industries that implement watermarking as a TPM must also
monitor the Web and other media for their works.126 The most
effective tool for this task is a "web crawler," a program that scours
throughout the entire Web looking for watermarks. 27 These pro-
grams are very thorough because they are able to search through a
website's entire content.1 2 8 Web crawlers, however, have certain
limitations; most significantly, they cannot penetrate firewalls,129
emails and their attachments, or other media besides the Web. 3°
iv. Trusted Systems
One ambitious, but not yet prevalent TPM is Trusted Systems.13 1
These TPMs are computer systems designed from beginning-to-end
for the sole purpose of information protection. 132 Trusted systems
require the implementation of all the TPMs previously discussed,
as well as several others.133 One ambitious view of the use of
Trusted Systems is that of Professor Mark Stefik.134 Stefik envi-
125. Id.; Stefik, supra note 19, at 142-44.
126. Digital technology has already and may further change the norms of usage of
copyrighted material because of the use of software and hardware that can effectively
monitor and control use. Madison, supra note 73, at 1073.
127. The most developed versions of these programs are Digimarc, a commercial
water marking and tracking system, found at http://www.digimarc.com. THE DIGITAL
DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 167 n.18. Standford University's Digital Library Project,
which can be found at http://www-diglib.stanford.edu/diglib/pub also has developed a
system that searches for excerpts of their text and audio files. Id.
128. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 166-67, 296-97.
129. A firewall is a "computer or computer software that prevents unauthorized
access to private data (as on a company's local area network or intranet) by outside
computer users (as of the Internet)." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTION-
ARY, available at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary (last visited Mar. 21, 2003).
130. John R. Therien, Comment: Exorcising the Specter of a "Pay-Per- Use" Society:
Toward Preserving Fair Use and the Public Domain in the Digital Age, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 979, 987-88, 988 n.39 (2001) (asserting that the DMCA's anti-circumven-
tion provisions are unconstitutional because they violate the First Amendment).
131. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 167.
132. Id. Trusted systems are information infrastructures whose entire structure, in-
cluding the computer processor, bios, hardware, and software, are designed to imple-
ment information protection. Id.
133. Supra notes 93-130 and accompanying text. In addition to TPMs, trusted sys-
tems would require trusted programs that can implement the same rationale as DRLs
for things such as printing, billing, and transferring. Stefik, supra note 19, at 141-54.
134. See Stefik, supra note 19, at 139-44. (describing in detail a trusted system in
practice). Mark Stefik is a research fellow at the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center,
manager of the Human-Document Interaction Area in the Information Sciences and
Technology Laboratory, and an adjunct member of the Secure Document Systems
Area in the Computer Science Laboratory. Id. at 137 n.2.
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.sions an entirely digital Trusted World, where information is dis-
tributed via these systems. 135 Under this vision, each computer
would have a personal private-key and all public-keys would be
published so that anything sent to that computer would be en-
crypted.1 36 This World would also rely heavily on DRLs to ensure
that individuals receive what they want while content owners are
compensated for the use of their copyrighted works.1 37 Stefik's
World encompasses all aspects of the traditional analog world into
a trusted system, including transfer, lending, printing, and copying
rights.138 Although Stefik's Trusted World is ideal because it pro-
vides extremely adequate efficiency, access, and convenience to
users, while simultaneously ensuring that copyright owners are
compensated, it fails to explain how, in practice, such a world could
be implemented.139
Although copyright owners have a variety of TPMs at their dis-
posal to help them protect their works, none are fool proof, but
rather, temporary fixes. 140 Hackers will eventually circumvent any
technology that is implemented.141 This creates a tremendous
problem for all industries within the NI, because circumvention of
their TPMs usually correlates with loss of money.1 42 Consequently,
135. Id. at 139-41.
136. Id. at 139.
137. Id. at 140-41, 144-53.
138. Id. According to Stefik's vision, individuals would be able to make use of
digital works in the same way that we have been accustomed to using books and other
tangible intellectual property. Id. at 145-46. For instance, the purchase of an e-book
would have programmed into its DRL the ability to be lent out a certain amount of
times. Id. at 147-49. Therefore, if user A desires to lend it out he would do so by
simply sending it to user B via B's public-key. Id.; see also THE DIGITAL DILEMMA,
supra note 62, at 167-78. As soon as it is loaned out, however, A would not be able to
use the e-book until it had been returned. Stefik, supra note 19, at 147-49; see also
THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 167-78. In addition, if A wants the e-book
back he would just choose that option and he would be able to use it, while B could
no longer. Stefik, supra note 19, at 147-49; see also THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra
note 62, at 167-78.
139. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at 167-71.
140. Id. at 157-58, 161-64; Therien, supra note 130, at 987-88.
141. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 435-36 (2001)
(holding that the publishing of sites where DeCSS the circumvention program to
decrypt encrypted DVD's was not fair use).
142. See Indrajit Basu, 448-bit Encryption: Key Walls Of Security, COMPUTERS To-
DAY, Feb. 15, 2000, at 78; Kate Henry, Technology Rules at Truliant Federal Credit
Union, AccEss CONTROL & SECURITY SYS. INTEGRATION, Apr. 2000; James Mackin-
tosh, National News: Barclays' gremlins raise big questions about online trust: Teething
troubles at internet banks could have wider repercussions, writes James Mackintosh,
FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Aug. 2, 2000, at 2; Phil Hunter, Passwords to Protection, COM-
PUTER WKLY., Jun. 11, 1998, at 36; Malcolm Rosario, E-security a Must to Prevent
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
although copyright owners may have the technology to prevent the
exploitation and unauthorized use of their works, unless hackers
are deterred and discouraged from circumventing TPMs, copyright
law will be weak and futile.
3. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and Its Progeny
a. ProCD v. Zeidenberg
In conducting an analysis of the DMCA and its protection of
TPMs it is also important to consider contractual licensing. Con-
tractual licensing is a non-technological protective measure that
copyright owners used before TPMs and the DMCA and continue
to use either alone or in combination with TPMs. 43 The impor-
tance of contractual licensing to this Note is primarily directed to-
wards the emergence of "shrink-wrap" contracts, its effect on fair
use and the copyright balance, and its scope outside the boundaries
of copyright law.
Although digitalization affects all forms of information and intel-
lectual property, it had an extremely significant affect on computer
programs. Prior to the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright law did
not explicitly protect computer programs;144 leaving copyright own-
ers uncertain and fearful of distribution.145 The emergence of digi-
talization characterized by greater ease of reproduction, access,
and free riding exacerbated copyright owners' fears. 146 Accord-
ingly, copyright owners turned to contracts to enforce their access
and use restrictions. 147 Even though the Copyright Act of 1976
currently protects computer programs, copyright owners continue
to use these measures extensively, no longer limiting it to computer
programs. 48
Copyright owners initially used shrink wrap contracts, the same
type of standard form contract used in ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg.14 9 These contracts received their peculiar name be-
Undetected Cyber Attacks, NEW STRAITS TIMES PRESS & BERHAD Bus. TIMES, Jun.
22, 2001, at 5.
143. Madison, supra note 73, at 1036-44.
144. Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir.
1984) (holding computer programs that satisfied the originality/creativity requirement
copyrightable).
145. Madison, supra note 73, at 1036-44. Copyright owner's main fears revolved
around the "first sale doctrine" because they were not sure how it would be applied
with their programs. Id.
146. Id. at 1036-37.
147. Id. at 1038-39.
148. Id. at 1043-45.
149. 908 F. Supp. 640, 644-45 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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cause they were usually found inside shrinkwrap sealed software
boxes, which if torn, constituted acceptance of its contractual
terms. 150 In ProCD, Inc., ProCD created an uncopyrighted tele-
phone number database, and placed it on a CD-ROM with its
copyrighted computer program, Selectphone that allowed users to
search and retrieve the factual data.15' ProCD sold its program
and the database in a typical shrink-wrapped box that contained a
notice on the outside that the use of the program was subject to a
license that could be found inside the box. 5 ' Inside the box was a
printed "license agreement" that explicitly listed several restric-
tions and limitations. 5 3 In addition, Selectphone contained a pop-
up screen with a "clickwrap agreement," notifying the user that use
of the program was conditioned on acceptance of the terms of the
license agreement, which must be accepted by clicking on the "I
Agree" button. 54 Defendant Zeidenberg purchased the program,
downloaded the database to a network server, and made it com-
mercially available to the public via the Web. 155 ProCD sued for
copyright infringement, breach of the license agreement, and un-
fair competition.156
The district court granted summary judgment to Zeidenberg on
the copyright infringement claim, because his use was governed by
Section 117 of the Copyright Act.157 The court, however, held that
although ProCD's CD-ROMS were uncopyrightable because they
lacked originality and creativity, they still fell within the "subject
matter of copyright.' 158
150. Id. at 650.
151. Id. at 644.
152. Id. at 651.
153. Id. at 644-45. The restrictions and limitations included a limited use of the
database and program to "individual or personal use," and a prohibition against copy-
ing the database listings to another computer or a networked computer giving the
user the option of using the product and accepting the license or returning the pro-
gram for a refund. Id.
154. Id. at 644-45; Madison, supra note 73, at 1050.
155. ProCD, Inc., 908 F. Supp. at 645.
156. Id. at 644.
157. Id. at 649-50. The district court granted summary judgment in Zeidenberg's
favor because 17 U.S.C. § 117 allows the copying of computer programs without lia-
bility if they are for archival purpose and are then destroyed or if it is necessary "as an
essential step in utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine"
states, which it held Zeidenberg satisfied. Id. at 648 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2003)).
158. Id. at 656-57. Copyright subject matter under the Federal Copyright Act is
broad. Section 102(a) lists eight categories as the "works of authorship" within sub-
ject matter of copyright. § 102(a). These categories, however, are intended to be il-
lustrative only, and flexible as to what can be copyrighted. See Apple Computer Inc.
v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding computer
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On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Judge Easterbrook reversed
and remanded the district court's ruling and instructed the court to
enter judgment for ProCD. 5 9 Judge Easterbrook based his hold-
ing on the fact that Zeidenberg was given notice of the "license
agreement" before he bought it, when he opened the box and read
the "license agreement," and before he used the program during
the pop up screen.1 60 Hence, in accordance with Uniform Com-
mercial Code ("UCC") section 2-204(1),161 because Zeidenberg
used the program instead of returning it for a refund, he accepted
the license agreement through his conduct.1 62 Judge Easterbrook
also dismissed the district court's preemption analysis and held
that, in accordance with Section 301 of the Copyright Act, a63 there
is a clear distinction between contract and copyright law because a
contractual agreement is enforceable independent of any copyright
issues as long as there is a valid agreement.1 64
Judge Easterbrook's decision holding ProCD's "shrinkwrap"
contract enforceable provided copyright owners with a strong tool
programs copyrightable as literary works). Therefore, many copyrighted works usu-
ally overlap one or more of these categories. Conversely, besides intangible works
the Copyright Act has two additional major exclusions. The first is "any work of the
United States Government," but it has the right to protect any works assigned to it.
§ 105. The second and most important exclusion revolves around the Idea/Expression
Dichotomy. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-05 (1879) (distinguishing between idea
and expression in determining copyrightability). Copyright protection is provided to
expressions of ideas only and not to the ideas themselves. See id. (distinguishing be-
tween the idea of accounting tables and the actual expression in a form). Thus, the
Copyright Act excludes anything that is not an expression. § 102(b).
159. ProCD, Inc v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
160. Id. at 1452-53.
161. UCC Section 2-204(1), states that a vendor may invite acceptance in any way
they desire and the buyer will then accept in the manner prescribed by the seller.
UCC § 2-204 (1) (2000).
162. ProCD Inc., 86 F.3d. at 1452.
163. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2003) states:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as speci-
fied by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible me-
dium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date
and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title.
Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any
such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
§ 301.
164. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1453-54. The main justification for this analysis is that
a contractual agreement between two individuals is not equivalent to a right provided
under copyright law, because in the former there is an added element, assent and
agreement. See id. at 1454 (distinguishing between a stranger who finds Selectophone
and uses it with someone who agrees to use it).
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to protect and regulate the use of their works. Accordingly,
"shrinkwrap" contracts evolved into "clickwrap' 1 65 and "browser-
wrap 1 66 contracts, which are presently part of all computer
software, hardware, and the Web. These contracts are usually in
the form of "End User Agreements" that list the specific uses that
are allowed, and other legal matters, such as forum selection and
choice of law clauses. 67 In addition, they breathe life and strength
into certain TPMs such as trusted systems.1
68
b. UCC-2B/UCITA
The debate regarding enforceability of these electronic contracts
and the implications they have on copyright is demonstrated by the
courts' inconsistent decisions regarding their validity. 69 Even
though their validity is questionable, licensing agreements embod-
ied in "shrink-wrap," "click-wrap," or "browser-wrap" contracts
were becoming widespread and significant to both copyright indus-
tries and users.1 70 Accordingly, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute
("ALI") initiated a project to draft Article 2B of the Uniform
Commercial Code to create a uniform set of laws covering software
contracts and licenses of information. 71 Although it initially began
165. "Clickwrap" agreements derive from the notion that a user acknowledges as-
sent to the terms of the "user end agreement" by clicking with the mouse on a link
usually labeled, "I agree." Megan E. Gray & Brian A. Ross, Contracts Drafting
Stronger Clickwrap Agreements, THE INTERNET NEWSL. INCLUDING LEGAL ONLINE,
Sept. 2001, at 1.
166. "Browserwrap" agreements are usually found on the Web and state that the
"site's users implicitly consent to the terms of the agreement when they use the site;"
thus, assent is accomplished by browsing through the site. Id. Some commentators
refer to these as "web-wrap" or "net-wrap" notices and contracts. Madison, supra
note 73, at 1061.
167. Madison, supra note 73, at 1058.
168. Supra note 131-39 and accompanying text.
169. E.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150-51 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding
that an arbitration clause that was included with various instructions and manuals
provided when purchasing a computer was valid and enforceable when the consumer
used the computer); ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1453-55; Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,
676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 570-75 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (holding that a seller's arbitration clause is
valid and enforceable because the consumer kept the product past the given period
allotted to return it); but see Step-Saver Data Sys. Inc. v. Wyse Technology and
Software Link Inc., 939 F.2d 91, 105-06 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a license agree-
ment disclaiming all warranties was not valid because the use of the product was not
conditioned on acceptance and because the license was provided after the purchase).
170. See Madison, supra note 73, at 1059-76 (describing the expansion of shrink-
wrap contracts).
171. The NCCUSL and ALl initiated this project after a recommendation from an
American Bar Association Subcommittee "concluded that there was a compelling
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as a project to amend Article 2, in 1995, after intense controversy
and debate, the focus of project was changed to the creation of a
new independent UCC article. 172 In 1998, however, the NCCUSL
decided to remove the new article from the UCC and to draft an
independent uniform act.173 On July 29, 1999, the NCCUSL
adopted the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
("UCITA") as a uniform set of laws to govern software contract
and licensing of information. 174
UCITA is primarily based upon two principles. First, it postu-
lates that a transaction involving digital information does not in-
volve a sale of goods, but rather "a license of computer
information;" and second, that a "commercial law should support
[contractual] freedom and interpretation of the [terms] in light of
the practical commercial context. 1 175 UCITA's scope is specific; it
covers computer information transactions, defined as "an agree-
ment ... to create, modify, transfer, or license computer informa-
tion or informational rights in computer information.' 1 76
Moreover, they define computer information as "information in
electronic form which is obtained from or through the use of a
computer, or which is in a form capable of being processed by a
computer. 17
7
When considering that the NCCUSL drafted UCITA because of
their desire to validate "shrinkwrap" contracts, it is not surprising
that the determination of how it would regulate these contracts
sparked much controversy and debate within the Drafting Com-
mittee.178 Eventually, the committee decided on a "heightened un-
need for clarity and certainty in licensing transactions of computer information," and
because they believed that these transactions did not qualify as goods to be governed
by Article 2 of the UCC. Mary Jo Howard Dively & Carlyle C. Ring, Jr, OVERVIEW
OF UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS AcT, NAT'L CONF. OF COM-
MISSIONERS ON UNIFORM ST. L. §I(E) (1999), available at http://www.ucitaonline.com/
docs/ring.pdf (last visited May 12, 2003).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at § I(A).
175. Id. at § II.
176. Unif. Computer Info. Transaction Act § 102(11) (Final Act Aug. 2002). This
covers support agreements, but does not apply merely because the contract is in digi-
tal form. Id.
177. Id. at § 102(10). UCITA applies to contracts made to license or buy software,
create computer programs, for on-line access to databases, and contracts to distribute
information over the internet. Id. at § 103(a) (providing the scope of the Act as com-
puter information transactions).
178. Dively & Ring, supra note 171, at § IV(B)(2).
Some participants in the process urged that they be banned outright, others
felt that UCITA should contain a list of terms which would impermissible
158
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conscionability standard" '179 as a public policy standard.18 0 It
provides that if a contract term "violates a fundamental public pol-
icy [courts] may" exercise other options besides enforcing the con-
tract. 81 These options include, refusing to enforce the contract
entirely, enforcing only the permissible terms, or "[limiting] the ap-
plication of the impermissible term so as to avoid a result contrary
to public policy. ' 182 In addition, the NCCUSL provides several
guidelines to help courts determine when the public policy stan-
dard is triggered. 83 Foremost, it asserts that courts should adhere
to public policies enumerated by their legislatures and be reluctant
to override contractual terms when there is no legislative pro-
nouncement, or where the parties have negotiated terms.1 84 Fur-
thermore, when considering a public policy claim, UCITA
explicitly lists a variety of factors that courts should consider.'85
Finally, it asserts that the "offsetting public policies most likely to
apply to transactions within this Act are those relating to innova-
tion, 1 6 competition,'187 fair comment,'188 and fair use.1
89 '
(such as, for example, terms prohibiting reverse engineering, terms prohibit-
ing certain kinds of comment about the software, etc.). Still others favored
complete freedom of contract and asked that the enforceability of shrink-
wrap contracts be subject to no greater restrictions than currently exist for
other negotiated contracts.
Id.
179. Id.
180. Unif. Computer Info. Transaction Act § 105(b) (Final Act Aug. 2002).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at cmt. § 3.
184. Id.
185. NCCUSL recommends that courts consider the following factors in entertain-
ing public policy claims:
[1.) The] extent to which enforcement or invalidation of the term will ad-
versely affect the interests of each party to the transaction or the public,
[2.)] the interest in protecting expectations arising from the contract,"
[3.)] the purpose of the challenged term,
[4.)] the extent to which enforcement or invalidation will adversely affect
other fundamental public interests,
[5.)] the strength and consistency of judicial decisions applying similar poli-
cies in similar contexts,
[6.)] the nature of any express legislative or regulatory policies, and
[7.)] the values of certainty of enforcement and uniformity in interpreting
contractual provisions.
Id.
186. Id. "Innovation policy recognizes the need for a balance between protecting
property interests in information to encourage its creation and the importance of a
rich public domain upon which most innovation ultimately depends." Id.
187. "Competition policy prevents unreasonable restraints on publicly available in-
formation in order to protect competition." Id.
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Under UCITA, a contract is formed using similar guidelines as
those considered by Judge Easterbrook in ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg.190 Assent is satisfied either by intentional manifesta-
tion of acceptance or implied by the user's conduct, including use
of the information. 191 UCITA requires that all copyright owners
provide users with an opportunity to review the entire license
terms before they can be deemed to have assented by conduct. 192
Additionally, if the copyright owner provides all the license terms
only after payment, UCITA will not consider the payment and use
assent by conduct. 193 Rather, under those circumstances UCITA
will acknowledge assent by conduct only if the copyright owner
provides the user with a right to refund if the user disagrees with
the terms. 194 UCITA also includes a special disclosure provision
for transactions made on the Web or "similar electronic site. 1 95
This provision requires disclosure of the entire license terms before
payment or delivery by conspicuously displaying their location, by
providing a copy of the terms, and by providing users with the abil-
ity to print or save these terms. 196
Under UCITA, the general rule related to contract terms is that
if the parties assented to the contract, the "terms of a record in-
cluding a standard form" prevail. 197 It also provides that a con-
tract's terms are interpreted "without regard to the party's
knowledge or understanding of individual terms in the record.' '1 98
UCITA, however, provides additional provisions for mass-market
188. "Rights of free expression may include the right of persons to comment,
whether positively or negatively, on the character or quality of information in the
marketplace." Id.
189.' Id.
Free expression and the public interest in supporting public domain use of
published information also underlie fair use as a restraint on information
property rights. Fair use doctrine is established by Congress in the Copy-
right Act. Its application and the policy of fair use is one for consideration
and determination there. However, to the extent that Congress has estab-
lished policies on fair use, those can taken into consideration under this
section.
Id.
190. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449-55 (7th Cir. 1996).
191. Unif. Computer Info. Transaction Act § 112(a)(1)-(2) (Final Act Aug. 2002).
192. Id. § 112(a)-(b).
193. Id. § 112(c); cmt. 2(c).
194. Id.
195. Id. § 114.
196. Id.
197. Id. § 208(1).
198. Id. § 208(3).
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licenses.199 Its main provisions are that it will not enforce any un-
conscionable terms or those violating public policy.200 It also pro-
vides users with a refund of the price paid, reimbursement, and
compensation for certain damages if a copyright owner does not
provide full disclosure of the terms before demanding payment or
tendering delivery.20 1 Finally, UCITA provides special provisions
for contracts formed by implied assent: it provides courts with a list
of factors to help determine the contract terms.20 2
UCITA provides copyright owners with the right of self-help in
retrieving possession of their copyrighted works and preventing
their unauthorized use on the condition that it is exercised without
a "breach of the peace ' 20 3 and subject to certain limitations if
taken without judicial process. 204 The only real limitation is that
electronic self-help is prohibited.20 5 Consequently, although copy-
right owners may use many protective measures to protect their
content, these measures are limited. Due to the fact that unautho-
rized exploitation of copyrighted works is detrimental to copyright
owners, the economy, and the public, in 1998, Congress enacted
the DMCA to address this problem.
4. Enactment of the DMCA
At the beginning of the Clinton Administration,20 6 former Presi-
dent William Jefferson Clinton announced an initiative promoting
a National Information Infrastructure, and established the Na-
tional Information Infrastructure Task Force's Working Group on
199. Id. § 209.
200. Id. § 209(a)(1).
201. Id. § 209(b).
202. Id. § 210(a).
The terms of the contract are determined by consideration of the terms and
conditions to which the parties expressly agreed, course of performance,
course of dealing, usage of trade, the nature of the parties' conduct, the
records exchanged, the information or informational rights involved, and all
other relevant circumstances. If a court cannot determine the terms of the
contract from the foregoing factors, the supplementary principles of this
[Act] apply.
Id.
203. Id. § 815(a)-(b).
204. Id. § 815(b).
205. Id. § 816. This is a change from the August 2001 draft where there were vari-
ous substantive limitations, such as that it will not be exercised in mass-market trans-
actions, it will be assented to, and it will not result in "substantial injury or harm to
the public health or safety or grave harm to the public interest substantially affecting
third persons not involved in the dispute." Id. § 816(b), (c), (f) (emphasis added) (Au-
gust 2001 Draft).
206. Former President William Jefferson Clinton was president from 1992 to 2000.
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Intellectual Property. °7 In September 1995, this task force re-
leased its report, "Intellectual Property and the National Informa-
tion Infrastructure: The. Report of the Working Group on
Intellectual Property Rights" ("The White Papers"). 2°8 The White
Papers recognized that digitalization and its new technology signifi-
cantly impacted copyrighted works, including the economic conse-
quences to authors and the industry in general. °9 In addition, it
proposed several recommendations, including adding section 1201
to the Copyright Act, which were later introduced in Congress as
the National Information Infrastructure Copyright Protection Act
("NIICPA").2 1 0 Due to prolonged controversy and debate, how-
ever, Congress never passed the bill.211
In December 1996, one hundred and sixty countries participated
in the World Intellectual Property Organization summit convened
to amend the Berne Convention so that it would recognize copy-
rights in digital works. 12 The United States actively participated in
WIPO by proposing its NIICPAs resolutions.213 WIPO partici-
pants eventually signed and ratified two treaties, the WIPO Copy-
207. PERRIT, supra note 62, § 103[F].
208. See generally INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF
THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995) [hereinafter THE
WHITE PAPERS].
209. Id. at 7-11.
210. Cohen, supra note 17, at 164. The proposed § 1201 titled, "Circumvention of
copyright protection systems;" contained the following provision,
No person shall import, manufacture, or distribute any device, product, or
component incorporated into a device or product, or offer or perform any
service, the primary purpose or effect of which is to avoid, bypass, remove,
deactivate, or otherwise circumvent, without the authority of the copyright
owner or the law, any process, treatment, mechanism, or system which pre-
vents or inhibits the violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner under section 106.
THE WHITE PAPERS, supra note 208, Appendix 1, at 6.
In addition, The White Papers also proposed to amend Section 106 of the Copyright
Act to recognize digital transmission as a form of public distribution. JOYCE ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 496.
211. Cohen, supra note 17, at 164.
212. PERRIT, supra note 62, at 653-54.
213. Cohen, supra note 17, at 166-67 n.17. Jukka Liedes, Chairman of the Commit-
tees of Experts, proposed the following provisions:
Article 13: Obligations Concerning Technological Measures
(1) Contracting Parties shall make unlawful the importation, manufacture
or distribution of protection-defeating devices, or the offer or performance
of any service having the same effect, by any person knowing or having rea-
sonable grounds to know that the device or service will be used for, or in the
course of, the exercise of rights provided under this Treaty that is not author-
ized by the rightholder or the law.
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right Treaty ("WCT") and the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty ("WPPT"), which partially adopted the NI-
ICPA's resolutions. 214 The WCT'recognizes "the right of commu-
nicating a work to the public by wire or wireless means" and "the
right of protection against 'infringing devices' that have the pur-
poses of decoding copyrighted information on computer net-
works. ' 215 Many individuals have recognized this treaty as the
cornerstone of the advancement of digital technology and e-com-
merce industries.216
In 1998, Congress enacted the DMCA, the most significant revi-
sion to the copyright law since the Copyright Act of 1976.217 The
DMCA is composed of five titles,218 the most significant is Title I,
entitled WIPO Treaties Implementation. 219 This discussion mainly
(2) Contracting Parties shall provide for appropriate and effective reme-
dies against the unlawful acts referred to in paragraph (1).
(3) As used in this Article, "protection-defeating device" means any de-
vice, product or component incorporated into a device or product, the pri-
mary purpose or primary effect of which is to circumvent any process,
treatment, mechanism or system that prevents or inhibits any of the acts
covered by the rights under this Treaty.
Id.
214. PERRIT, supra note 62, at 653. Although, the one hundred and sixty countries
participating initialed the final draft, the treaties are not binding until they are actu-
ally ratified by each country. Id. The United States has ratified both treaties. Id.
215. Id. at 653-54. The general norms that the WCT established in regards to ap-
plying copyright law to digital works are as follows:
1) [Copyright] owners should have an exclusive right to control the making
of copies of their works in digital form;
2) [Copyright] owners should have an exclusive right to control the commu-
nication of their works to the public;
3) [Countries] can continue to apply existing exceptions and limitations, such
as fair use, as appropriate in the digital environment, and can even create
new exceptions and limitations appropriate to the digital environment;
4) [Merely] providing facilities for the communication of works should not
be a basis for infringement liability;
5) [It] should be illegal to tamper with copyright management information
insofar as this would facilitate or conceal infringement in the digital environ-
ment; and
6) [Countries] should have "adequate legal protection and effective legal
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures"
used by copyright owners to protect their works from infringing uses.
Samuelson, supra note 17, at 528-29.
216. Samuelson, supra note 17, at 528-34.
217. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
218. The five titles are: Title I-Wipo Treaties Implementation, Title II-Online
Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation, Title III-Computer Maintenance or
Repair Copyright Exemption, Title IV-Miscellaneous Provisions, Title V-Protec-
tion of Certain Original Designs. Id.
219. Id. §§ 2, 2860.
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emphasizes § 1201, "Circumvention of copyright protection sys-
tems. '2 20 Before discussing the controversy and debate surround-
ing § 1201, it is important to first understand its three main
provisions, the "basic provision", the "ban on trafficking" provi-
sion, and "additional violations" provisions.22'
a. Basic Provision
The "basic provision" is § 1201's core element.222 Generally,
§ 1201 subjects an individual to civil and criminal penalties for the
circumvention of a copyright owners' TPM.123 It provides that,
subject to certain enumerated exceptions, "[no] person shall cir-
cumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to
a work protected under this title. ' 224 A technological measure as
stated is any of the many TPMs that copyright owners can imple-
ment to protect their works, such as encryption, passwords, or
trusted systems. 25 Therefore, it defines circumventing a techno-
logical measure as, "to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an
encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate,
or impair a technological measure, without the authority of the
copyright owner. 226
At first glance the words, "effectively controls access to a work",
lead to a circular argument and, if taken literally, render the basic
provision futile.227 If § 1201 were taken literally, then an individ-
ual' s act of circumvention would relieve him of liability because
his ability to circumvent the TPM would indicate its ineffective-
ness. Congress, however, avoided this problem by delineating a
measure as effective if, "in the ordinary course of its operation, [it]
requires the application of information, or a process or a treat-
ment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to
220. Id. §§ 103, 2863-873.
221. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2001).
222. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Supra note 93-141 and accompanying text. But see Real Networks, Inc. v.
Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 Dist. Lexis 1889, at *27-30 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18,
2000) (rejecting for preliminary injunction purposes that RealNetworks proprietary
media format in of itself constituted an effective technological measure, thus a format
converter was not considered an anti-trafficking tool). The court refused to find that
proprietary formats were a TPM because finding them as indistinguishable would
thwart the purposes of the Copyright Act and DMCA by discouraging the creation of
format converters and the dissemination of information. DRATLER, JR., supra note
56, at 2-16 to 17.
226. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
227. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A)
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the work. '228 In other words, a TPM is considered "effective"
when the copyright owner places a barrier that prevents access,
which, unless authorized by her, would require some action to gain
access.12 9 This is consistent with Congress' intention to "establish a
general prohibition against granting unauthorized access" since
Congress described circumventing a TPM as "the electronic
equivalent of breaking into a locked room in order to obtain a copy
of a book. '230 Therefore, contrary to a copyright infringement
claim where the copyright owner's exclusive rights are violated,231 a
violation under § 1201 merely requires obtaining unauthorized ac-
cess, whether or not the individual intends to infringe the copyright
owner's exclusive rights or her use is authorized.232
b. Ban on Trafficking
Section 1201's second provision, the "ban on trafficking," was
enacted by Congress to supplement the basic provision.233 Con-
gress deemed it necessary to prevent circumvention by analogy to
other circumvention prohibitions they had previously enacted.234
This section provides that, "[no] person shall manufacture, import,
offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology,
product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that [is] pri-
marily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a
228. Id. § 1201(a)(3)(B).
229. DRATLER, JR., supra note 56, at 2-17 to 18; see also Real Networks, Inc., 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *23-24 (denouncing defendant's claim that Real Networks
TPM was not effective because they were able to circumvent it). Congress, however,
did not intend this prohibition to extend to circumvention in order to correct a dis-
torted or substandard quality product caused by the TPM. H.R. REP. No. 105-551,
pt.2, at 40 (1998).
230. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt.1, at 17.
231. Section 106 of the Copyright Act specifically enumerates a copyright owner's
exclusive rights, which is complete, exhaustive, and prohibits any other rights from
being inferred. § 106. For purposes of this discussion, only the first three of these
rights, the right to reproduction, prepare derivative works, and distribute are relevant.
Id.
232. DRATLER, JR., supra note 56, at 2-21. A § 1201(a)(1)(A) violation is indepen-
dent of any other violations including copyright infringement and the anti-trafficking
prohibition. Id.
233. § 1201(a)(2).
234. Congress believed that in order for the "basic provision" to be effective it was
necessary to develop a prohibition on the development of technologies primarily in-
tended to circumvent TPMs. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt.2, at 38 n.2 (1998) (analogiz-
ing circumvention of TPMs to cable and satellite decoders); H.R. REP. No. 105-551,
pt.1, at 18 (targeting black box technology); S. REP. No. 105-190, at 11, 28 (1998).
Congress analogized this provision to 17 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4), which prohibits the crea-
tion of "black boxes" that allow individuals to receive unauthorized cable service.
H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt.1, at 18.
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technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title. ' 235 Although this provision may appear
broad and all encompassing, Congress intended to specifically tar-
get "black boxes" that are "expressly intended to facilitate circum-
vention of technological protection measures for purposes of
gaining access to a work. 236
Black boxes are technological devices intentionally created to il-
legally gain access or use to restricted materials.2 37 Black box tech-
nology was common as far back as the seventies when the infamous
John Draper, also known as Captain Crunch, pioneered the art of
"phone freaking. '2 38 Draper circumvented telephone companies'
computer systems by emitting a 2600-Hertz frequency whistle with
a plastic whistle he found in a Captain Crunch cereal box. 39 Sub-
sequent phone freakers created a technological device that could
emit several frequencies into a phone line marking the emergence
of black box technology. Black box technology, however, is more
common in the cable and satellite industries where decoders and
H-Card programmers enable individuals to access all channels
without having to pay. 4 °
Congress repeatedly emphasized that the ban on trafficking be
directed towards black boxes because they wanted to "ensure that
legitimate multipurpose devices [would] continue to be made and
sold . . . [and that while protecting copyright owner's rights it
would] simultaneously allow the development of technology." 2 41
For that reason, Congress provided three conditions to distinguish
235. § 1201(a)(2)A [emphasis added].
236. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt.2, at 38. Congressman Bliley from the Committee
on Commerce stated that "it is very important to emphasize that Section [1201(a)(2)]
is aimed fundamentally at outlawing so-called 'black boxes'." Id.; see also H.R. REP.
No. 105-551, pt.1, at 18 (discussing the DMCA's purpose and Congress' intention).
237. Real Networks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1889, at *11-12 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000) (asserting that the "Streambox VCR acts
like a 'black box' which descrambles cable or satellite broadcasts so that viewers can
watch pay programming for free.")
238. Phone Freaking means hacking into computerized phone lines in order to
make unlimited free phone calls.
239. Jim Krane, Plugged In; Who's Using Your Cell Phone?; It could become vul-
nerable to hackers, NEWSDAY, Mar. 19, 2002, at D09.
240. Real Networks, Inc., U.S. Dist LEXIS, at *11-12; Armond D. Budish, Cable
Decoders are not Legal, COLUMBus DISPATCH, July 24, 1999, at 2D; Patricia
Hurtadozz, Cable-TV Decoder Boxes Seized; A 'major seller' arrested in bust, NEws-
DAY, Dec. 10, 1988, at 3. These devices can easily be obtained over the internet; supra
note 234. See, e.g., http://www.cabledescramblerquality.com/; http://www.descrambler
man.com/; http://www.testcardworld.com/; http://www.huworld.com/ (last visited Mar.
21, 2003).
241. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt.1, at 18.
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black box technology from other technologies. 242 To satisfy these
conditions, the black box technology has to be "primarily designed
or produced 2 43 for circumventing TPMs, it must be a tool that
"has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other
than "244 circumventing a TPM, or be "marketed by that person or
another acting in concert with that person with that person's
knowledge for use" in circumventing a TPM.245 Since Congress,
however, was concerned with enabling the further development of
technology, they intended these conditions to be flexible.246
c. Additional Violations
The "additional violations" prohibition is worded almost exactly
as the ban on trafficking provision, except for two elements.247
First, instead of being directed at the circumvention of a TPM that
controls access, it is directed at a TPM that "protects a right of a
copyright owner in a work or a portion thereof. ' 248 Second, unlike
the basic provision which is violated only when there is a circum-
vention of a TPM placed or authorized by the copyright owner, the
additional violations provision applies to any TPM placed on the
copyrighted work regardless of who placed it.2 49 Section 1201,
however, does not prohibit the circumvention of a TPM protecting
or regulating how the work is used, but only bans-the trafficking
in tools-that will circumvent the TPMs protecting the use con-
trols. 250 In other words, a person who has access, lawful or unlaw-
ful, to a copyrighted work and circumvents its use controls is not
violating the additional violations prohibition; rather, the individ-
ual who provided her with the tools to circumvent the use controls
is liable.251 The individual who actually circumvented the use con-
242. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A)-(C) (2001).
243. Id. § 1201(a)(2)(A).
244. Id. § 1201(a)(2)(B). This language was added to make sure that this Section
was applied to black boxes only so far as to protect copyright owners, while also
allowing the development of further non-black box technology. Nimmer, supra note
17, at 687-88. For instance, this would not apply to computers, tape recorder, VCRs,
or Servers. Id.
245. § 1201(a)(2)(C).
246. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt.1, at 10; H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt.2, at 39-40;
DRATLER JR., supra note 56, at 2-34.1.
247. § 1201(b)(1)(A).
248. Id.
249. Id. The additional violation's provisions omits any reference to circumvention
of encryption and other TPMs, but rather states its purpose broadly. DRATLER, supra
note 56, at 2-31- 32.
250. Nimmer, supra note 17, at 689-90.
251. Id.
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trols, however, is not free from liability because she is subject to an
infringement suit under traditional copyright law.252 Furthermore,
the "additional violations" provision provides a broader definition
of circumvention than the trafficking provision, as merely "avoid-
ing, bypassing, removing, deactivating, or otherwise impairing a
technological measure" without any illustrations of TPMs.253
Therefore, under the "additional violations" provision, any use-
control device, whether or not placed by the copyright owner, is
considered a TPM 4
d. Statutory Exceptions
In addition to providing additional prohibitions to protect copy-
right owners, the DMCA also provides several limitations on
§ 1201.255 Its main limitation is the exemptive authority that Con-
gress provided to the Library of Congress. 6 The Library of Con-
gress has the power to promulgate exemptions in an informal
rulemaking proceeding every three years. 7 This power, however,
is subject to four limitations.258 First, any such exemption promul-
gated applies only to the basic provision and cannot be used as a
defense or exception to any other statutory rule, including the ban
on trafficking and additional violations.259
252. Id. at 690.
253. § 1201(b).
254. DRATLER, JR., supra note 56, at 2-31 to -33.
255. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(E).
256. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
257. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(i)-(v).
In conducting such rulemaking, the Librarian shall examine-
(i) the availability for use of copyrighted works;
(ii) the availability for use of works for nonprofit archival, preservation, and
educational purposes;
(iii) the impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of technological
measures applied to copyrighted works has on criticism, comment, news re-
porting, teaching, scholarship, or research;
(iv) the effect of circumvention of technological measures on the market for
or value of copyrighted works; and
(v) such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate.
Id.
The first and fourth factors are directed at keeping the balance between the copyright
owner's private interests and the public's interest in copyright law, while the second
and third factors reiterate similar principles as those for fair use. DRATLER, JR., supra
note 56, at 2-28.4 to -28.5. Finally, the last factor provides the Library with some
leeway for judgment in their decisions. Id.
258. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(E).
259. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(E). If the Library determines that a certain class of works
deserves exemption, individuals would be able to circumvent the TPMs that control
access; but if someone provides them with the tool to do so the individuals would still
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The second limitation is that the exemption must cover only "a
particular class of works" protected under Title seventeen. 260 This
becomes an issue, if § 1201's words "[no] person shall circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title" are taken literal then it applies § 1201 to
all works covered under Title Seventeen.2 61 Title Seventeen, how-
ever, in addition to protecting copyrighted works also covers digital
audio recordings 262 and unfixed live musical performances. 26
3
Therefore, although § 1201 applies to all works covered by Title
Seventeen, this exemption only applies to works protected by
copyright.264
Third, the Library of Congress requires that individuals show a
need for the exemption by providing evidence that they are or will
be "adversely affected by" the basic provision "in their ability to
make noninfringing uses of that particular class of works. ' 265 Fi-
nally, the library exemption lasts for only three years until the next
rulemaking proceeding, the Library of Congress must then deter-
mine de novo whether the class of works is still being substantially
adversely affected.266
In addition to the rulemaking proceeding, Congress provided a
strong substantive limitation on § 1201 by asserting that a TPM is
not deemed "effective" if it unreasonably degrades or distorts the
quality of authorized copies, performances, or displays of copy-
righted works.267 Moreover, it explicitly enumerated seven statu-
tory exceptions to the DMCA's provisions.268 These enumerated
exceptions cover: bona fide encryption research;269 law enforce-
ment intelligence; 270 security testing of computers, systems, and
be liable under the "ban on trafficking" prohibition. DRATLER, JR., supra note 56, at
2-35 to -36.
260. § 1201(a)(1)(B).
261. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A)
262. Id. §§ 1002(a), 1006(a), 1009(a), 1101(a).
263. Id. § 1101(a)(2).
264. DRATLER, JR., supra note 56, at 2-19 n.34, 2-27.
265. § 1201(a)(1)(B). The legislative history makes it clear that this is a rigid re-
quirement, necessitating a showing of substantial adverse effect. 65 Fed. Reg. 64558-
59 (Oct. 27, 2000).
266. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(C); DRATLER, JR., supra note 56, at 2-2.4.
267. Congress stated that "it is important to stress ... that those measures that
cause noticeable and recurring adverse effects on the authorized display or perform-
ance of works should not be deemed to be effective." H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt.2, at
40 (1998); see also DRATLER, JR., supra note 56, at 2-56 to -57; supra note 229.
268. § 1201(e)-(j).
269. Id. § 1201(g).
270. Id. § 1201(e).
20031
170 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
networks;z71 circumventing and disabling TPMs that have the effect
of collecting and disseminating the user's personal information;2 72
limiting minor's access to certain material on the internet; 73 re-
verse engineering to enable interoperability of computer pro-
grams;2 74 and libraries, archives, and non-profit educational
institutions' ability to circumvent a TPM to decide whether to buy
the work.275
II. RESPONSES TO SECTION 1201
Digital technology and the NI are very important for both copy-
right owners and the public. 2 76 As Congress and the White Papers
asserted however, if copyrighted works are not protected from cir-
cumvention and piracy the public will not benefit from technol-
ogy. 2 7 7 Accordingly, the DMCA's § 1201 was intended to upgrade
copyright law so that it could properly protect digital copyrighted
works. 278 This unprecedented legislation has caused much uproar
and unrest from commentators opposing its enactment. Those op-
posed to § 1201 claim that because it is too broad, restrictive, and
indiscriminative, it will have the effect of hindering or diminishing
"fair use" and that it will disturb the delicate copyright balance by
unfairly providing too much power and control to copyright
owners.
2 79
Proponents of § 1201 disagree. They assert that § 1201 is neces-
sary to further the growth and stimulation of the copyright and e-
commerce industries.28 ° Moreover, they claim that § 1201 will
271. Id. § 12010).
272. Id. § 1201(i).
273. Id. §1201(h).
274. Id. § 1201(f).
275. Id. § 1201(d). In addition, libraries are insured that they will never be exposed
to either civil or criminal liability as long as they act in good faith. For instance, they
will not be exposed to monetary fines if they were not aware that they were commit-
ting a violation and they will never be exposed to criminal penalties. S. REP. No. 105-
190, at 65 (1998); see also MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, CR1 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT: CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REPORTS ON THE DIGITAL MILLENIUM
COPYRIGHT AcT AND CONCURRENT AMENDMENTS CR 1:4 -78 (2000).
276. See supra notes 62-142 and accompanying text (discussing digital technology
and TPMs that copyright owners can use).
277. Supra notes 208-221 and accompanying text; see also Real Networks, Inc. v.
Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *12 (W.D. Wash. Jan.
18, 2000).
278. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2.
279. Infra Part II.A.
280. Infra Part II.B.1. The copyright industries refer to the publishing, music, or
other industry dealing with copyrighted works.
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neither hinder "fair use" nor disturb the copyright balance, but that
these too will have to adapt to the new technology. 81
Finally, there are commentators who claim that the real danger
to "fair use" and the copyright balance does not stem from the
DMCA's § 1201, but rather from the enactment of UCITA. 82
These commentators claim that UCITA disturbs "fair use" and the
copyright balance because it will validate "shrink-wrap" contracts
allowing copyright owners to condition access to their copyright
works on contractual licensing terms that may require consumers
to abandon all rights and privileges.283
A. Arguments Against the DMCA
Legal commentators did not welcome warmly the enactment of
Title 1, more specifically § 1201, of the DMCA. Due to its unprec-
edented approach in dealing with copyright issues in the digital
age, the section has been criticized on several fronts. Those who
criticize § 1201 for its alleged creation of a pay-per-use world with
unbalanced interests claim that § 1201 unfairly sways the balance
between the public and copyright owner's private interests almost
completely towards the latter.284
Some commentators assert that § 1201 is unconstitutional be-
cause the First Amendment and the democratic process require
that all citizens have access to a broad and expansive public do-
main and the "widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources, which they allege § 1201 will
curtail.286 This is commonly known as the Democratic Paradigm/
First Amendment argument.287
Finally, the "Market Failure Theory" claims that the framers of
the Constitution created copyright law as a response to the mar-
ket's failure to protect authors' and creators' works.2 88 TPMs and
contractual licensing, however, currently provide copyright owners
with adequate protection.289 Hence, this theory contends that cop-
281. Infra Part II.B.1.
282. Infra Part II.B.2.
283. Infra Part II.B.2.
284. Infra Part II.A.1.
285. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Benkler, Common
Use, supra note 17, at 358.
286. Infra Part II.A.2.
287. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 357-58; Netanel, supra note 17, at
288.
288. Infra Part II.A.3.
289. See supra notes 91-205 and accompanying text (discussing TPMs and ProCd).
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yright owners should be able to opt out of copyright law protection
because these safeguards in conjunction with § 1201 provide copy-
right owners with a disproportionate balance of power and
rights. 9°
1. An Unbalanced "Pay-Per-Use World"
Commentators who espouse the view of a pay-per-use world
with unbalanced interests acknowledge and fear digital technology
and TPMs' strengths and potential benefits.2 91 They acknowledge
that digital technology and the Web provides a "plethora of infor-
mation ... to individuals, often for free, that just a few years ago
could have been located and acquired only through the expendi-
ture of considerable time, resources, and money. ' '292 They also,
however, fear that these technologies may hinder access and distri-
bution of copyrighted works. 293 For instance, they recognize that
TPMs allow copyright owners to effectively restrict and protect
their works before publication, a traditional right.294 Yet, TPMs
also potentially give copyright owners the ability to go further and
control access and use of their works, including traditional and law-
ful uses such as reselling, reviewing, and quoting after their first
publication. 95
In addition, these commentators claim that TPMs have the abil-
ity to lock up and restrict public domain works that have tradition-
ally been free to the public, as well as information content not
subject to copyright protection.296 They allege that copyright own-
ers' restraint of information content would be detrimental to pro-
spective authors because it would preclude the beneficial aspects of
information spill-overs.297 Their main fear is that users will have to
290. Infra Part II.A.3.
291. Cohen, supra note 17, at 179-87; Nimmer, supra note 17, 683-84, 711-15.
292. Nimmer, supra note 17, at 693.
293. Id. at 711.
294. Id. at 710-11. This traditional right is the common law right of first publica-
tion, which is now provided for under the exclusive right to distribute, § 106(3).
295. Nimmer, supra note 17, at 711-12.
296. Id. at 712-13; see also Cohen, supra note 17, at 176; infra note 298.
297. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology
Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999) (explaining Silicon Valley's success and Massachusetts'
Route 128's failure on the notion that the unenforceability of post-employment cove-
nants not to compete in California facilitated information spillovers and the growth of
the industry and technology, whereas their enforcement in Massachusetts had the
contrary effect). Information spillovers are very beneficial to prospective copyright
owners because it may provide them with a greater amount of raw materials from
which they may create new copyright works. This effect is illustrated by Professor
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pay to access and use these works, which would be in a new digital
format.298 Professor Cohen, a proponent of this view, has gone as
far as to propose that § 1201 require, as a prerequisite to protec-
tion, copyright owners to "[design TPMs that would] allow any
uses of the underlying works that would be lawful. ' ' 299 Conse-
quently, because of TPM's potential and strength, these commen-
tators believe that TPMs' ability to prevent access to works "could
well prove to be the legal foundation for a society in which infor-
mation becomes available only on a 'pay-per-use basis'."3 ° It is
the advent of this world and the manner in which § 1201 would
interact and affect access to information content that these com-
mentators most fear.30 1
Their main contention is that in a pay-per-use world § 1201
would convert the limited monopoly power provided by the Con-
stitution into a perpetual right.30 2 This conversion would, thereby,
fundamentally alter the copyright balance by making the copyright
owners' interest "the paramount consideration - at the expense of
research, scholarship, education, literary or political commentary,
[and] the future viability of information in the public domain. 303
Gilson's analysis and explanation of Silicon Valley's success and Massachusetts'
Route 128's demise based primarily on non-compete covenants, which had the effect
in Route 128 of restraining employees from taking ideas and inventions and using
them in other companies or their own start up companies. Id. at 592. Whereas in
Silicon Valley where these covenants are not enforced there is tremendous mobility
and sharing of ideas and inventions by employees who leave companies unrestrained
by these covenants. Id. at 588-92.
298. Nimmer, supra note 17, at 712-13. Professor Nimmer illustrates this point
through two illustrations. Id. at 712-14. The first is a late nineteenth century Louisi-
ana Cookbook that is not found in many places, which, although a public domain
work, a publisher will digitize by scanning and add editorial comments thereby mak-
ing his digital version copyrightable. Id. at 712. The second example is an early 1920s
jazz recording that, as a public domain material, is not found in digital format, so the
publisher digitalizes the recording and sells it at the same price of a copyrighted re-
cording. Id. at 713-14.
299. Cohen, supra note 17, at 176. She acknowledges, however, that this require-
ment would not work for two reasons. Id. First, TPMs are too valuable to digital
content providers and copyright owners; second, it would be a "near-impossible task"
for TPMs to carry out the factual equitable inquiry required for fair use and other
privileges. Id. at 176-77.
300. 144 CONG. REC. H 7094 (daily ed. Aug. 4 1998); Nimmer, supra note 17, at
710-15; Samuelson, supra note 17, at 542. A pay-per-use world is one where individu-
als would have to pay for not only access to every type of work, but also for every
type of use of such works. See Stefik, supra note 19, at 149 (discussing digital reuse of
copyrighted works and paying for the use of public domain materials).
301. Cohen, supra note 17, at 176-77; Nimmer, supra note 17, at 710-28; Samuelson,
supra note 17, at 541-42.
302. Nimmer, supra note 17, at 721.
303. Id.
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They claim that § 1201 provides copyright owners with this asym-
metric right because its anti-circumvention provision is too broad,
rigid, and all-encompassing. °4 It does not discriminate between
circumvention for unlawful purposes and circumvention for lawful
purposes-such as fair use.3 °5
Proponents of this view, including Professor Nimmer, argue that
the basic provision's 30 6 inability to consider the circumventer's in-
tended use of the work poses the greatest danger to copyright's
public interest.30 7 They claim that analogous to other provisions in
the DMCA, Congress should have specifically designed § 1201 to
apply only to specific situations, such as, when the circumventer's
intent is infringement or other illegal purpose.308 Under this pro-
posal, liability for circumvention would be determined in hindsight
after the circumvention and actual use had occurred.30 9
Alternatively, it could have required that copyright owners who
use TPMs "provide the means to overcome that measure for par-
ties acting within the scope of their rights. ' 310 Professor Cohen's
proposition, referred to as the "Cohen Theorem," best illustrates
this contention by stating:
Copyright owners cannot be prohibited from making access to
their works more difficult, but they should not be allowed to
prevent others from hacking around their technological barriers.
Otherwise, the mere act of encoding a work within a [TPM]
would magically confer upon vendors greater rights against the
general public than copyright allows.311
304. Nimmer, supra note 17, at 727-31; Samuelson, supra note 17, at 531-33.
305. Nimmer, supra note 17, at 727-31; Samuelson, supra note 17, at 531-33.
306. Supra notes 222-32 and accompanying text.
307. Nimmer, supra note 17, at 727-31.
308. Id. at 707. Professor Nimmer specifically looks at the DMCA exceptions to
the Ephemeral Recording Exemption, 17 U.S.C. § 112(a)(2) that provide for in-
stances where a copyright owner places a TPM that prevents a broadcaster from using
its right to record a performance or display to facilitate transmission. Id. at 705-07
n.185-86. The DMCA provides that, if the copyright owner places a TPM, they "must
make available to the transmitting organization the necessary means for permitting
the making of such copy." Id. at 705-06, 706-07 n.186 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 112(a)(2)
(1995)). In addition, if the owner fails to provide this tool it gives broadcasters the
right to self-help by circumventing the TPM. Id. at 705.
309. See id. 705-07 (discussing ephemeral recording exceptions).
310. Id. at 707. This second example is derived from the Vessel Hull Design Protec-
tion Act, enacted to protect boat hull designers who were left powerless by a Supreme
Court decision in Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
Accordingly, this provision holds a seller or distributor of a protected hull design lia-
ble only if he "induced or acted in collusion with a manufacturer to make, or an
importer to import, such article." Id. at 709 (quoting 17 U.S.C. 1309(b)(1)).
311. Cohen, supra note 17, at 178, 178 n.74.
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In addition, these proponents assert that § 1201's blanket prohibi-
tion more commonly known as the "ban on trafficking" is too
broad.312 They claim that this provision should have provided ex-
emptions for fair use and other privileges, because "technologies
that might be used for indisputably unlawful purposes are the same
technologies that are useful for achieving many lawful and socially
valuable ones. ' 313 Their main argument against this provision is
that it determines what technologies fall into this category through
an effects test; whether the effect of the technology is illegal, rather
than whether it was "intentionally designed or produced to enable
copyright infringement. '314 The practical consequence of this test
is that technology that may have been created for another purpose,
but has the effect of being primarily used for the circumvention of
TPMs, will fall into this category unless its original or other pur-
pose constitutes a "commercially significant purpose or use. "315
Since many technologies that were not "primarily designed or pro-
duced" to circumvent TPMs may be prohibited, this "[effects-
rooted provision] threatens lawful and socially valuable
conduct. "316
These commentators also claim that Congress' inclusion of
§ 1201(c), which provides that "[n]othing in this section shall affect
rights, remedies, limitations,317 or defenses to copyright infringe-
ment, including fair use,13 18 makes clear that it intended for users
to continue to enjoy non-infringing uses of copyrighted works even
if they were protected by TPMs.319 Congress' statement of inten-
tion also mandates that the ban on trafficking provision be nar-
rowed, be interpreted narrowly by courts, and that it should
312. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2001); see also supra notes 233-44 and accompanying
text.
313. Cohen, supra note 17, at 172.
314. Samuelson, supra note 17, at 532-33; see also Cohen, supra note 17, at 172
(finding the anticircumvention provisions as too broad); Nimmer, supra note 17, at
736-38 (describing the anticircumvention prohibitions as too broad).
315. § 1201(b)(1)(A)-(C).
316. Cohen, supra note 17, at 172. Professor Cohen goes even further and claims
that TPMs that prevent "all copying or all free copying, will almost certainly frustrate
some actions that the Copyright Act would permit." Id. at 175.
317. In addition to fair use the limitations that this provision refers to are the ex-
ceptions for library and archive use provided under 17 U.S.C. § 108; the exception for
home audio taping provided by the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992; and the
exception under the first sale doctrine provided under 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
318. § 1201(c)
319. Samuelson, supra note 17, at 539.
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recognize limited purpose tools intended solely to carry out fair
use.
320
Nevertheless, these commentators credit Congress with acknowl-
edging the potential risks and dangers that are inherent in § 1201's
legislation, thereby motivating them to include many exceptions to
§ 1201.321 They claim, however, that the exceptions that were in-
tended to resolve the potential inhibition of fair use and lack of
access, the rulemaking procedure 322 and the exception for "non-
profit [libraries], archives, or educational institutions, 323 are inade-
quate and insufficient to balance copyright's private and public
interests.324
The main problem with both of these exceptions is that they ap-
ply only to the DMCA's basic provision, leaving users liable for the
ban on trafficking and additional violations provisions. 325 Thus, if
an individual proves to the Library of Congress that he "[is] likely
to be .. .adversely affected by virtue of such prohibition in [his]
ability to make non-infringing uses of that particular class of
works" and also satisfies the enumerated factors that they must
consider, they will grant an exemption from liability for the basic
provision for all users.326 The rulemaking procedure, however, will
not provide an exemption to the ban on trafficking and additional
violations prohibition.327 Therefore, although users may obtain the
privilege to circumvent TPMs to gain access to the copyrighted
work, they claim that in practice this privilege is a sham;328 because
unless an individual is technically savvy enough to circumvent the
TPM, she will be in the same position as before the exemption.329
Similarly, these commentators claim that the exemption for
"[non-profit] libraries, archives, and educational institutions" also
suffers from this deception because libraries are given only the
320. Id.
321. Nimmer, supra note 17, at 693-94, 717-21; Samuelson, supra note 17, at 559-60;
supra notes 256-75 and accompanying text.
322. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(E). See also supra notes 256-66 and accompanying text.
323. § 1201(d).
324. Nimmer, supra note 17, at 735-37; Samuelson, supra note 17, at 560.
325. Nimmer, supra note 17, at 735-37; Samuelson, supra note 17, at 559-60; see also
supra notes 256-66, 323 and accompanying text. Professor Nimmer also finds that the
rule making procedure exception provides too much power to the Library of Con-
gress, a fact-finding equitable power that should belong to the courts. Nimmer, supra
note 17, at 698. Accordingly, the only alternative users would have is to appeal pursu-
ant to the Administrative Procedure Act. Id.
326. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(E); see also supra notes 256-66 and accompanying text.
327. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(E); see also supra notes 256-66 and accompanying text.
328. Nimmer, supra note 17, at 735-37; Samuelson, supra note 17, at 559-60.
329. Nimmer, supra note 17, at 735-37; Samuelson, supra note 17, at 559-60.
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privilege to circumvent TPMs.33 ° Thus, since the "ban on traffick-
ing" still applies, these organizations are unable to exercise their
privilege unless they can circumvent the TPMs themselves.331
Since the effect of these statutory exceptions is too narrow, com-
mentators claim that "[Congress] should have adopted a provision
enabling courts to exempt acts of intervention engaged in for other
legitimate purposes. "332
The commentators who maintain that § 1201 is too broad and
overly protective of copyright owners' interest assert that Congress
should have taken action to remedy this problem.33 3 They main-
tain that Congress can and should "intervene to remedy the lack of
availability of a class of works [because] the law can value the right
of public access to available works more heavily than the property
rights of the owners of those works. ' 334 Therefore, since § 1201
hinders the public's access to and use of copyrighted works, Con-
gress was under a duty to create narrow exceptions to ensure that
access and use by the public is maintained.335 Finally, if the public
has traditionally been allowed to quote, review, criticize, and par-
ody copyrighted works as part of a constitutional right intended to
safeguard First Amendment interests of free speech and the ad-
vancement of knowledge, "then Congress was under an obligation
to frame § 1201 in a manner that preserves that right. 336
2. First Amendment/Democratic Paradigm Argument
a. Copyright's Production Function
Proponents of this argument,337 specifically Professors Benkler
and Netanel, claim that the DMCA's § 1201 is unconstitutional be-
cause it hinders the First Amendment's freedom of speech,
330. Nimmer, supra note 17, at 700.
331. See Nimmer, supra note 17, at 735-37 (describing the ban on trafficking's effect
through an illustration); Samuelson, supra note 17, at 559-60 (discussing the exception
to the DMCA through the librarian of Congress).
332. Samuelson, supra note 17, at 538. Professor Samuelson provides as an illustra-
tion as to the legitimate purposes that should be allowed.
333. See supra notes 292-332 and accompanying text (discussing the advent of a
pay-per-use world).
334. Nimmer, supra note 17, at 678-79.
335. See id.
336. Id.
337. This theory is also referred to as the Democratic Paradigm theory. See gener-
ally Netanel, supra note 17, at 288. Its main principle is that copyrighted works and
all other expressions of speech are vital to principles of democracy because they main-
tain and encourage public discourse, which furthers openness, diversity, and freedom.
JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 69-70. Accordingly, copyright law has two major func-
tions in supporting democracy. Id. First, it must encourage and reinforce copyrighted
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thereby, threatening our democratic civil society.338 These com-
mentators claim that § 1201 harms the public domain, a vital and
indispensable source of speech that has the effect of compelling the
"widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and an-
tagonistic sources. ' 339 Professor Netanel refers to this phenome-
non as "copyright's production function," a function whose main
role in furthering democracy is to foster association and
education.34 °
This function is significant because the public domain's existence
is vital to our democratic process and the public's welfare. 341 The
Supreme Court has acknowledged that a diversity of views is im-
portant to democratic governance and the First Amendment in its
dual role; first, in maintaining an "uninhibited marketplace of ideas
in which truth will ultimately prevail ' 342 and second, maintaining
the public's right to, "receive suitable access to social, political, es-
thetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences. ' 343 Hence, a diverse
public domain is central to both democracy and the public welfare
because its depletion will have dire consequences for the public's
democratic civil society by affecting public communication and dis-
course.344 A diminished democratic civil society will adversely af-
fect the public's democratic governance,345 their "assertion of
popular sovereignty over the . . . representative democratic
works. Second, it must provide economic incentives for authors so that further works
are created. Id.
338. Professor Netanel defines a democratic civil society as the "sphere of volun-
tary, nongovernmental association in which individuals determine their shared pur-
poses and norms." Netanel, supra note 17, at 342.
339. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); see also N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
340. Netanel, supra note 17, at 347-51. More specifically this function is to foster
the production and dissemination of original expression of a "broad range of political,
social, cultural, and aesthetic matters" by providing an economic incentive. Id. at 348.
341. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 358, 366; see also Benkler, Consum-
ers to User, supra note 17, at 565.
342. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
343. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 368-69.
344. Netanel, supra note 17, at 342-45.
345. Professor Netanel claims that in order to maintain a democratic governance
there must exist a "robust, pluralist civil society" in the form of a "'democratic cul-
ture,' a belief in and understanding of the democratic process that becomes embedded
in the minds, habits, and character of a people." Netanel, supra note 17, at 342-43.
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state ,' 346 and their ability to collectively "self-rule outside formal
institutions of government.
347
The public domain is also significant because it balances the in-
herent conflict between the' Constitutional mandates of the First
Amendment that "Congress shall make no law abridging the free-
dom of speech '348 and that of the Copyright Clause, which pro-
vides Congress with the power to provide authors and creators
with a monopoly for a limited time.34 9 The public domain balances
these conflicting mandates by being the "legal space within which
Congress has 'made no law'. 35 °
b. Copyright's Structural Function
These commentators also assert that the DMCA's § 1201 will ad-
versely affect what Professor Netanel calls "copyright's structural
function."3 'l Copyright's structural function is the promotion of
public discourse by ensuring that creation and dissemination is free
from state and elite patronage and by limiting the private control
of creative expression.352 Professor Netanel first asserts that copy-
right must adapt to digital technology because copyright owners
will be dependent on state and elite patronage if their economic
incentives are not protected. 3  Copyright owners' dependency on
these individuals will cause censorship of information and deter the
creation of diverse views.354 Professors Netanel and Benkler, how-
ever, conclude that too much protection is detrimental to the struc-
tural function because it may lead to the commercial concentration
of information content.355 The overall effect of this centralization
346. Id. at 343. Professor Netanel also asserts that the public's assertion of popular
sovereignty will be affected because this requires certain citizenship skills and oppor-
tunities that a democratic civil society fosters. Id. at 343-44.
347. Id. at 344. Professor Netanel believes that the public's ability to self-rule will
be affected because a democratic civil society provides the sites for public association
and the forum for discussion and debate where the public's norms, beliefs, and stan-
dards are created, which are a vital element to self-governance. Id.
348. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
349. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
350. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 393.
351. Netanel, supra note 17, at 352-63.
352. Id. at 352.
353. Id. at 352-62 (discussing how copyright law historically freed authors from pa-
tronage by allowing them to make a living from their works and how the failure to
protect digitial content can revert to pre-copyright eras of patronage).
354. Id. at 352-58.
355. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 400-01; Netanel, supra note 17, at
358-61. Professor Benkler believes that large corporations buying the rights to infor-
mation and placing TPMs and contractual restrictions on their use will centralize in-
formation content. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 400-01; Netanel, supra
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will be a shift from the process of creating a status quo through a
democratic process to a system where those who control informa-
tion will unilaterally determine the status quo.356
Commercial centralization of information content will alter the
creation of the status quo by having two adverse effects on access
and diversity.357 First, commercial concentration of information
content by a small number of individuals will negatively affect the
democratic public discourse by diminishing or eliminating many
views that would motivate discussion, debate, and challenge the
status quo.358 Commentators claim this effect is inevitable because
in the event of commercial concentration of information content,
information producers would only produce and publish either their
own views, or the views that they deem the majority of the public
would most likely accept. 9 Under the. first scenario, only the
views of a small number of powerful individuals, either the elite or
the state, would pervade the market place of ideas.360 Under the
second scenario, which they believe is more likely, only a few main-
stream views with which the majority of the public agrees will be
available, thereby, eliminating many other important views.361
The main point of this argument is that the minority producers of
information content will prevent many "diverse and antagonistic"
views, an essential element to the welfare of the public,362 from
pervading the public domain and society.363 If citizens do not have
the ability to experience and understand society's different political
and social views, then society will not determine its status quo
through a democratic process where individuals discuss and debate
note 17, at 362-63. Accordingly, since these corporations will have a monopoly over
these rights, preventing others from using them, citizens and smaller information pro-
ducers will only have a small amount of information to work with and create future
works. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 405-07; Netanel, supra note 17, at
360-61.
356. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 379; see also Netanel, supra note 17,
at 358 (stating that "copyright constitutes an integral part of a system of collective
self-rule in which the norms that permeate our social relations and undergird state
policy are determined in the space of broadbased citizen debate, rather than by gov-
ernment of private fiat").
357. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 377-83 (discussing commercializa-
tion's affects on public discourse and self-governance).
358. Id. at 378-79.
359. Id. at 378; see also Netanel, supra note 17, at 358 (stating that under commer-
cial concentration of information producers would only cater to the wealthy who
would buy their works).
360. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 378; Netanel, supra note 17, at 358.
361. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 378; Netanel, supra note 17, at 360.
362. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
363. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 409.
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all their options and agree on those they deem best.364 Conversely,
they claim that the status quo would merely be the, "expression of
entrenched powers preventing discussion of change." '365
The second adverse effect of commercial concentration of infor-
mation content is that in conjunction with society's distribution of
wealth they will significantly impact the vital democratic element
of public discourse.366 They assert that since commercial products
are distributed to individuals primarily based on wealth, this will
cause an "unequal distribution of private power over information
flows." '36 7 This unequal distribution of information content will
provide the individuals who are already in power and command
with control over information, while the poor and the middle class
obtain only inferior information.368 Henceforth, the majority of so-
ciety lack the "diverse and antagonistic views ' 369 that are necessary
to encourage and summon public discourse and debate. 370 This is
detrimental because citizens' inability to engage in public discourse
and debate will prevent them from challenging the social, eco-
nomic, and political powers, as well as, the status quo.37' Moreo-
ver, Professor Netanel claims that private control of the public
domain, which inhibits the public discourse by limiting prospective
authors and creators' resources should be remedied by creating a
new form of derivative right.372 He asserts that this and other limi-
tations, "are an affirmative manifestation ... that, where necessary
to further [copyright's democracy enhancing principles], ideas and
expressions should be free for all to use. '373 This new derivative
right "would limit copyright owner[s'] control over transformative
uses," thus, allowing the public to challenge mainstream informa-
tion content.374
364. Id.; Netanel, supra note 17, at 354, 358.
365. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 379.
366. Id. at 379-81.
367. Id. at 380.
368. See id. (asserting that "power over information flows mirrors economic
power"). Professor Benkler assumes that many works such as research, study, and
scholarship will not be published and disseminated because they do not have a strong
commercial value. Id. at 405-07 (referring to the scholarly lawyer and Joe Einstein
strategies as being the least successful).
369. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
370. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 380.
371. Id. at 379-80.
372. Netanel, supra note 17, at 362-63, 378-81; see also supra note 76.
373. Netanel, supra note 17, at 363 (emphasis added).
374. Id. at 362-63. Professor Netanel, however, also recognizes that without a
strong derivative right the original copyright owners and prospective authors or cre-
ators might not be encouraged to create and disseminate because of the "multiple
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c. First Amendment Argument
Additionally, these commentators claim that the combination of
these two factors may also have a censorial effect on the distribu-
tion of ideas and information.375 According to this argument, if the
wealthy elite and corporations have control of information and in-
formation production, they will prohibit the dissemination of any
information that is detrimental to their interests.376 Unlike the
public discourse argument, this is an explicit and outright prohibi-
tion on speech.377 Thus, these proponents claim that once the en-
closure of the public domain and reduction of diverse and
antagonistic views are recognized as a regulation of information
production and exchange, then, it becomes evident that § 1201's
restrictions require heightened constitutional scrutiny.378 They
claim that although § 1201 is content and viewpoint neutral, its ef-
fects on speech are not incidental because its entire purpose is to
prohibit the use and communication of information.379 Therefore,
§ 1201 must satisfy the constitutional standard of intermediate
scrutiny to be Constitutionally legitimate.38 °
One of this argument's major premises is the assumption that
information is "free as the air to common use," and as such cannot
be restricted unless necessary. 38' Relying on this premise, it asserts
that the First Amendment's freedom of speech provision requires a
taker" dilemma. Id. at 379. The dilemma is that authors may not go through hard
work of creating if someone else can create a derivate of the work that will replace it
using their hard work. Id.
375. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 380-81; see also Netanel, supra note
17, at 362 (discussing how a media conglomerate may create censure by preventing
the use of information that may be adverse to them).
376. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 380; Netanel, supra note 17, at 362.
This argument assumes that the information content producers will obtain as much
public domain materials that they can find and enclose them using TPMs. Benkler,
supra note 17, at 402-05 (describing the four different strategies of information pro-
duction initially using public domain material); Netanel, supra note 17, at 314-16
(describing neoclassicists view regarding the use of public domain to gain the most
economic benefit).
377. See Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 380-81 (stating that individuals
are censored because the information owners prohibit them from speaking).
378. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 372 (discussing the Turner Broad
System v. FCC litigation); see also Turner Broad. Sys., v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640-
41(1994) .
379. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 413.
380. See id. (stating that these laws must show that they "serve an important gov-
ernmental interest, and to do so without restricting substantially more speech than
necessary").
381. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 357-58, 413; see also Int'l News Serv.
v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).,
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flourishing and strong public domain.382 A robust public domain is
necessary because free speech is the antithesis of property rights, it
belongs to no one and is privileged to all.383 Therefore, if a society
lacked a public domain, its citizens' freedom of speech would
merely be a negative liberty, a right to speak only as far as they
used their own words and did not violate others' property rights.384
Hence, they claim that any legislative action that dwindles and en-
closes the public domain, "conflicts with the First Amendment in-
junction that government not prevent people from using
information or communicating it," 385 which would also hurt the
public's democratic civil society.386
Although these commentators recognize Congress' justifications
and interests in enacting § 1201 they reject them as equivocal as to
whether they justify the outcomes it produces. 387 Accordingly, like
Professor Nimmer, they claim that § 1201 is too broad because it
fails to discriminate between infringing and permissible uses.388
382. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 357-58; Benkler, Consumers to User,
supra note 17, at 577.
383. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 357-58, 390-94.
384. Id. at 358, 390-92. The connotation of freedom of speech as a negative liberty
derives from the doctrine of the Constitution as a charter of negative liberties. Id. In
other words, this doctrine asserts that the Constitution merely states what the govern-
ment cannot do to citizens; however, it does not provide an affirmative obligation to
provide these elements to citizens. Id. As applied to this scenario, it would mean
that, although the government cannot take action to prohibit speech, it does not have
any obligation to foster or nourish this right. Id. Therefore, without a public domain,
although citizens have a theoretical freedom of speech, in practice the right is very
limited because they can speak only about what facts and ideas belong to them. Id.;
see also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96
(1989) (finding that the due process clause does not "impose an affirmative obligation
on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means).
385. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 358.
386. Netanel, supra note 17, at 350-51.
387. They recognize three justifications that Congress had for enacting section
1201:
First, in the absence of adequate protection, producers will not make content
available in a digital form capable of networked distribution. Second, the
copyright industries are an important economic sector of the U.S. economy,
particularly in terms of exports. They need this protection to sustain all the
jobs and revenue that they generate because contemporary technology
makes the production and dissemination of unauthorized copies too easy.
Finally, the legislation must prohibit circumvention per se, not only circum-
vention for the purposes of infringement, because relying on legal enforce-
ment of copyright is more cumbersome and porous than self-help.
Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 423; see also Netanel, supra note 17, at 289-
90 (providing suggestions for the manner in which copyright should respond to these
concerns).
388. Supra notes 306-16 and accompanying text.
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They assert that § 1201's basic provision prosecutes circumvention
of TPMs on a per se basis, regardless of the use.389 Therefore, if an
individual desired to access a TPM-protected work to exercise his
privilege of fair use or his. right to free speech, he would automati-
cally be liable.390 In addition, they argue that the ban on trafficking
and additional violations provisions are lawful only because § 1201
legalizes the basic provision.391 Although they recognize that the
majority of § 1201's exceptions are valid, they claim that in general
these exceptions are inadequate. 392 They, like many other com-
mentators, believe that the exceptions' fundamental oversight is
their failure to include a broad exception for circumvention when
the intended use is privileged.393
Hence, proponents of the First Amendment/Democratic Para-
digm argument conclude that it is not clear that Congress' justifica-
tions in enacting § 1201 are important government interests. 394
Even if they were, due to its per se application and the inadequacy
of its exemptions § 1201 potentially creates too many First Amend-
ment constraints and costs.
3. Market Failure Theory
Proponents of the Market Failure Theory claim that the com-
mercial market, TPMs, and contractual licensing are presently able
to adequately protect copyright owners' works to a sufficient de-
gree, enabling them to derive enough economic gain to serve as an
incentive to further create and disseminate.395 Hence, instead of
providing copyright owners with more protection via § 1201, they
should be given the opportunity to opt-out of copyright law
entirely.396
The underlying assumption on which this argument depends is
that both the market and common law's failure to protect copy-
389. Benkler, Common Use, supra note 17, at 415-16.
390. See id. (stating that its "civil and criminal sanctions apply to circumvention
per se, whether or not the underlying use is privileged").
391. Id. at 416-17.
392. Id. at 418-19. Professor Benkler claims that the library exception in 17 U.S.C.
§ 108 is meaningless because it would not be financially reasonable for any commer-
cial publisher to deny libraries the ability to read the content before purchasing it. Id.
at 418. Although he validates all the other exemptions, he fails to mention anything
at all about the rule making procedure exception codified in 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a)(1)(B)-(E). Id. at 418-19.
393. Id. at 419.
394. Id. at 412.
395. Bell, Escape from Copyright, supra note 17, at 745-50, 786-87.
396. Id. at 745, 788-803.
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right owners' interests in their work originally stimulated the devel-
opment of copyright law.397 Since copyright owners were unable to
reap sufficient gains from their work, the Framers of the Constitu-
tion believed that there was insufficient incentive "to Promote the
Progress of Science and Useful Arts. ' 398 Thus, under the justifica-
tion of a public benefit, copyright law provided a significant statu-
tory exception to the default rule "that a free people, respecting
common law rights and engaging in market transactions, can copy
expressive works at will."
399
Over time, however, amendments and revisions to the Copyright
Act have provided copyright owners with broader and greater
powers.400 For instance, the term of a copyright has been gener-
ously expanded;4 10 Congress has interpreted the language of the
Copyright Clause to cover a larger selection of subject matter;40 2
and, most importantly, copyright owners' exclusive rights have
been multiplied.40 3 These commentators proclaim that the availa-
bility and effectiveness of TPMs and common law rights, including
contractual licensing, provide copyright owners with, "unprece-
dented control over their works." 4° Through the use of TPMs and
the common law, copyright owners are able to regulate access, use,
reuse, payment, and ownership information of their copyrighted
works.40 5 Thus, they are no longer susceptible to the market and
common law's failure to protect them.40 6
Since common law, TPMs, and copyright law together provide
copyright owners with an overabundant source of exclusive rights
and protection, these proponents claim that the balance between
397. Id. at 747.
398. Id. at 747; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
399. Bell, Escape from Copyright, supra note 17, at 759; see also Ray Patterson,
Copyright and the "Exclusive Right" of Authors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 22 (1993)
(arguing that "[copyright] is an intrusion upon the common-law public domain").
400. Bell, Escape from Copyright, supra note 17, at 781-84.
401. Id. at 781.
402. Id. at 781-83; supra note 158.'
403. Bell, Escape from Copyright, supra note 17, at 783-84; supra note 231.
404. Id. at 747. Professor Hardy claims that the increasing effectiveness of digital
technology exacerbates free-rider and piracy concerns, which will drive many copy-
right owners to favor opting-out of copyright and rely solely on TPMs and contract
law. Trotter Hardy, Contract, Copyright, and Preemption in a Digital World, 1 RicH.
J. L. & TECH. 2, 47-48 (1995).
405. Professor Bell provides a sufficient summary of the many commentators who
believe that the use of TPMs will provide copyright owners with too much control
over their works. Bell, Escape from Copyright, supra note 17, at 747. He acknowl-
edged, however, that TPMs existence and standardization into the market is inevita-
ble because of the financial incentives they stand to provide. Id.
406. Id. at 747-50.
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copyright owners and public's interest has been destroyed.4 °7 Ac-
cordingly, they propose giving copyright owners the choice of opt-
ing-out of copyright law when the combination of any of these
measures is too strong, °8 too broad and excessive,4 °9 or when an
inconsistency between copyright law and either common law claims
or TPMs create an invalid restriction.4 1 0  Before discussing the
methods of opting-out of copyright law it is worthwhile to examine
the counter-arguments posed against this view and their responses.
a. Lockean Natural Rights Counter-Argument
The first counter-argument, the Lockean Natural Rights argu-
ment, removes the market failure theory's major axiom that the
right to opt-out is derived from copyright's origin as a response to
the market failure, by considering copyright a natural right 411
rather than a function of the market.412 In response to this
counter-argument these commentators argue that the Framers of
the Constitution never intended copyright law to be a natural right,
but, even had it been, that it is irrelevant to the choice of opting-
out of copyright law.413
407. Id. at 780. It is also very important to take into consideration that present
copyright owners are united into large, influential lobbying blocks, whereas users are
divided and have less influential lobbying power. Id. at 786.
408. This would occur when common law rights, either contract or torts, in conjunc-
tion with copyright are too strong and detrimental to the public. Id. at 744-45.
409. Id. This scenario would take place when copyright law and TPMs combined
are too excessive and restrictive. Thus, the law should give these individuals the right
to choose between either: "1) limiting the effect of those non-statutory protections
and exploiting the Copyright Act; or 2) abandoning copyright and relying on techno-
logical tools and the common law rights affiliated with them." Id. at 745.
410. Id. This would occur when a contractual license is deemed invalid because it
attempts to secure rights not allowed under copyright law, such as restricting fair use
or the first sale right. Id. Since the contractual license would give the copyright
owner rights prohibited under copyright law, he should have the right to choose be-
tween "1) abandoning suspect terms of the license and falling back on copyright pro-
tection; or 2) abandoning copyright and relying on contract law to secure the interests
in question." Id. at 788-93.
411. The Natural Rights/Lockean labor theory has been influential in the realm of
copyright throughout history. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 64. Its major principle is
that authors should be entitled to "reap the fruits of their creations, to obtain rewards
for their contributions to society, and to protect the integrity of their creations as
extensions of their personalities." Id. at 63. Accordingly, under this principle copy-
right law's primary purpose is to protect authors; Natural Rights. Id. Nonetheless,
Lockeans claim that the public's interest in copyrighted works would be advanced by
two limitations imposed upon individuals: that they leave enough quality resources
for others and that they not commit waste. Id. at 65.
412. Bell, Escape from Copyright, supra note 17, at 760.
413. Id. at 760-76.
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They generally assert that the supposition that Locke's labor the-
ory414 was the theoretical foundation for copyright law is mistaken
for two reasons.415 First, they claim that Locke's labor theory dealt
only with tangible physical property in which: an individual creates
a new embodiment through the sweat of their brow.416 Hence,
since Locke's principles did not apply to intangible intellectual
property and the "noumenal realm of ideas; '4 17 the Framers of the
Constitution could not have imposed such interpretation upon it.418
Second, they claim that copyright law is inconsistent with Locke's
justification of property rights419 because he believed that any re-
straint or monopolization of property constituted a "'manifest...
invasion of the trade, liberty, and property of subject."' 420
Moreover, they claim that the incorrectness of this supposition is
illustrated by three facts. First, the original state copyright laws
referred to natural rights only as a matter of rhetoric and fagade,
but not in substance.421 At the time of the enactment of these laws,
state legislators were enacting copyright laws to appease a small,
but influential population of authors and creators.422 These legisla-
tors were aware that the enactment of copyright laws contradicted
the pervasive view that, "statutory monopolies favored special in-
terests over common liberties. ' 423 Accordingly, they cloaked copy-
right restrictions within the rhetoric of natural rights only to
prevent criticism and unrest.424
Second, none of the state copyright laws on their face provided
restrictions framed as natural rights.425 Contrary to natural rights,
which would be perpetual, all-encompassing, and unconditioned,426
414. Supra note 411.
415. Bell, Escape from Copyright, supra note 17, at 763-64.
416. Id. "Sweat of the brow" is commonly used to refer to Locke's labor theory.
See also Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 360-61 (1991) (dis-
cussing the use of the "sweat of the brow" principle as a legal standard).
417. Bell, Escape from Copyright, supra note 17, at 763.
418. Id. at 763-65.
419. Id. at 763-64.
420. Id. at 763.
421. Id. at 765-70.
422. Id. at 766.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 766-67. State legislators were specifically worried that their constituents
would criticize them for creating the same sort of monopolies that had stimulated the
revolution. Id. at 767.
425. Id. at 767-70.
426. Id. at 767.
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state copyright laws provided a copyright for a limited time,427 for
only a limited subject matter,42 8 and conditioned protection on cer-
tain requirements.42 9  Furthermore, similar to the Copyright
Clause, which lacks any vestige of natural rights, the wording of
both the state statute and the Copyright Clause seem to invoke a
Utilitarian43 ° vision theory.431
Finally, they refute the argument that copyright, as a natural
right, prohibits copyright owners from opting out by illustrating the
Framers' original intentions, through the words of James
Madison.432 In response to Thomas Jefferson's critique of the
Framers for not including a Bill of Rights that explicitly prohibited
427. Id.; see also Francine Crawford, Pre-Constitutional Copyright Statutes, 23
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 11, 21-3 (1975) (discussing the state copyright terms as vary-
ing from fourteen to twenty-eight years).
428. Bell, Escape from Copyright, supra note 17, at 767; see also Crawford, supra
note 427, at 18-21. None of the original thirteen states' copyright statutes covered
paintings, prints, sheet music, or sculpture. Id. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
Rhode Island had the broadest statutes covering only literary works. Bell, Escape
from Copyright, supra note 17, at 767 n.123.
429. Bell, Escape from Copyright, supra note 17, at 768-69. Most states condition
copyright protection on some requirement including identification, forfeiture of a
copy to registrar, donation of copies to public libraries, and providing works in rea-
sonable numbers and rates. Id. at 768 n.133.
430. The Utilitarian/Incentive theory is the most widely accepted by courts and
commentators. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 1, at 61; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (holding Nation's publishing of an article
using unauthorized excerpts from President Ford's unpublished manuscript not fair
use); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (hold-
ing that the manufacture of video cassette recorders were not liable for contributory
infringement); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (stating, the "economic philos-
ophy behind the clause . . . is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort
by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors"). This theory is based upon the notion that society must pro-
vide economic incentives to encourage authors to continue creating and disseminating
their works because copyrighted works provide a vital benefit to the public. JOYCE ET
AL., supra note 1, at 61-63. Utilitarianism derives its premise by assuming several
axioms. Id. First, it assumes that copyrighted works are not perishable or exhaustible
because the simultaneous use by many does not extinguish a work's essence. Id. Sec-
ond, that if these works are not protected authors will not be able to reap the eco-
nomic benefits of their work, which will deter them from creating and disseminating
future works. Id. at 63. Finally, that giving author's absolute protection is also detri-
mental because it would subject their works to market forces, which may enable au-
thors to charge excessive prices, making works unavailable to the general public. Id.
Accordingly, copyright law's purpose is to regulate the market and legal system in
order to create an intermediate point where the scope and period of protection will
provide authors with sufficient economic gains to encourage them to create and dis-
seminate, while simultaneously providing the general public with sufficient access and
use to these works. Id.
431. Bell, Escape from Copyright, supra note 17, at 769-70.
432. Id. at 770-74.
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monopolies, Madison justified the Copyright and Patent clauses by
using Utilitarian rhetoric. 33 If the Framers had intended to apply
natural rights concepts in the copyright context, it is most likely
that they would have defended the Copyright and Patent Clauses
by using natural rights rhetoric, especially since Jefferson was one
of the "foremost advocate of natural rights, ' 434 yet, there is no
mention of natural rights.435
b. Public Discourse Counter-Argument
Market failure champions also respond to the counter-argument
that there is still a market failure because copyright law was prima-
rily enacted to promote public discourse. 436 The counter-argument
states that there is still a market failure since TPMs, common law
rights, and copyright law do not provide sufficient protection to
works vital to public discourse, research, scholarship, and educa-
tion.437 Market failure theorists respond by asserting that although
the Copyright Clause was enacted to promote the greater good and
the public's interest in access to works, "it by no means follows that
the public has any affirmative right to access copyrighted works. 438
Similarly, although they recognize that the promotion of public dis-
course is an important copyright foundation, they claim that, "it is
not clear that it means that the copyright owner should be under a
greater obligation to facilitate copying or even to avoid steps to
make copying harder just because some user may be a fair user. 439
433. Id.
Monopolies are sacrifices of the many to the few. Where the power is in the
few it is natural for them to sacrifice the many to their own partialities and
corruptions. Where the power, as with us, is in the many not in the few, the
danger can not be very great that the few will be thus favored. It is much
more to be dreaded that the few will be unnecessarily sacrificed to the many.
Id. at 772.
434. Id. at 773.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 774; Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair
Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 33 (1997)
(discussing the market failure argument in the context of fair use).
437. Bell, Escape from Copyright, supra note 17, at 774-75; Loren, supra note 436,
at 33.
438. Bell, Escape from Copyright, supra note 17, at 775 (emphasis added).
439. Id. (quoting Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. LEGAL
STUD. 393, 409 (1993) (supporting digital self-enforcement because it reduces transac-
tion costs and increases diversity of content)).
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c. Methods of Opting-Out of Copyright
Since neither the natural rights nor the public discourse argu-
ment appear to prohibit providing copyright owners with the right
to opt-out of copyright law, they propose three ways to accomplish
this.44° First, is the doctrine of "election of remedies," which allows
copyright owners to choose between inconsistent copyright law and
common law protections.441 This doctrine provides an individual
who has been injured or incurred damages with the right to choose
one out of many legal ways to compensate them for their injury or
damages, however, if the individual has coexistent, but inconsistent
remedies and chooses one then they are prohibited from exercising
the remainder of their options.442 Although there may be some
problems in getting a court to recognize this doctrine's application
to copyright law, its proponents claim it can be easily managed.443
The second option is to abandon the Copyright Act's protections
entirely.444 Under this option, the expressive works would fall into
the public domain and copyright owners would then protect them
solely through TPMs and common law rights. 445 The main issue
that this alternative presents, however, is whether a court would
recognize a former copyright owner's common law rights." 6 These
commentators claim that this alternative, like the first one, can be
easily accomplished.447
The last option is to suspend a copyright owner's statutory rights
through the doctrine of "copyright misuse. ' 441 According to Pro-
fessor Bell, this doctrine, "requires a copyright owner who has vio-
440. Bell, Escape from Copyright, supra note 17, at 788-801.
441. Id. at 788-93. This doctrine is based plaintiff's right provided by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to plead alternatively and inconsistently to several causes of
action. FED. R. Civ. P. 8. It appears, however, that although plaintiffs are allowed to
plead several causes of actions they are entitled to one remedy. Costello Publ'g Co. v.
Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v.
Peoples Theatres Inc., 24 F. Supp. 66, 74 (D. Mass. 1933); Bieg v. Hovnanian Enters.,
Inc., Civ. No. 98-5528, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17387, at *18-19 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1999).
442. Bell, Escape from Copyright, supra note 17, at 788 (quoting, BLACK'S LAw
DICrIONARY 518 (6th ed. 1990)).
443. Id. at 790-93. Although 17 U.S.C. § 301, copyright preemption, may prevent a
copyright owner from alleging some common law claims, Professor Bell claims that
this problem can be remedied easily by pleading an extra element or right that copy-
right does not provide, such as privity or assent. Id. at 790.
444. Id. at 793-98.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 795.
447. Id. Similar to the election of remedies doctrine, a plaintiff would need to craft
his pleadings carefully in order to avoid preemption by 17 U.S.C. § 301. Id.
448. Id. at 798-801.
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lated public policy by combining statutory rights and common law
right to either forsake the former and rely on the latter, or reform
any associated practices so as to end the misuse."44 9 Accordingly,
an individual could decide not to reform her unauthorized practice
and rely solely on her common law rights.45 0 Consequently, these
commentators claim that because § 1201, in conjunction with copy-
right owners' ability to use TPMs and common law rights, will dis-
proportionately provide copyright owners with unbalanced power,
courts should allow them to opt-out of copyright law and rely
solely on TPMs and common law.45'
B. Arguments Supporting the DMCA
1. Section 1201 is not Adverse to Fair Use and the
Copyright Balance
Congress and Commentators who support § 1201 justify its en-
actment mainly because of the impact and significance it will have
on the economy-specifically the copyright and e-commerce indus-
tries.452 As the Judiciary's Committee Report to the Senate makes
clear, the "[copyright industries] are one of America's largest and
fastest growing economic assets." '453 The industry has not only
grown exponentially faster than any other industry,4 54 but it cur-
rently accounts for a significant percent of our Gross Domestic
Product ("GDP").455 The copyright industry also plays a very im-
portant role in maintaining a stable workforce in the United States,
since its employment rate usually increases in much larger expo-
nents than the economy as a whole.456 Moreover, besides being a
449. Id. at 800.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 744-45.
452. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 8-9 (1998).
453. Id. at 10.
454. Id. The Senate Report indicates that in twenty years the copyright industries
have grown twice as fast as the rest of the economy. Id. While the remainder of the
economy grew at a rate of 2.6 percent the copyright industry grew at 5.5 percent. Id.
455. The Senate Report also indicates that in 1996, the last full statistics available at
the time of the enactment of the DMCA, these industries accounted for 3.65 percent
of the United States' Gross Domestic Product, which was $278.4 billion. Id.
456. "Between 1977 and 1996, employment in the U.S. copyright industries more
than doubled to 3.5 million workers," which was 2.8 percent of the total U.S. employ-
ment. Id. In addition, between "1977 and 1996 U.S. copyright industry employment
grew nearly three times as fast as the annual rate of the economy as a whole", 4.6
versus 1.6 percent. Id.
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vital element to our domestic economic well-being, it leads all
other industries in foreign exports and sales.457
Supporters of § 1201 claim that the copyright and e-commerce
industry's successful accomplishments are mainly a result of their
involvement in the digital world.458 Although digitalization allows
for the creation of broader markets and products, it also provides a
larger potential for piracy and unauthorized uses.4 59 Due to the
grave effect piracy can have on the digital world, copyright owners
and the WIP0 4 60 have acknowledged that TPMs are very impor-
tant, not only to the continued economic successes of these indus-
tries, but also to their further development.46'
Although TPMs are very advanced and effective in protecting
copyrighted works, they are not impenetrable; inevitably, other
technologies will be created to defeat them. 62 Congress shared the
same view and believed that it should enact the WIPO treaties be-
cause, along "[with] this evolution in technology, the law must
adapt in order to make digital networks safe places to disseminate
and exploit copyrighted works. ' 463 Furthermore, both Congress
and former President Clinton's National Information Infrastruc-
ture Task Force believed that if no action was taken, the "growth of
the [Internet would] be stifled, and public accessibility [would] be
retarded" because copyright owners would be unwilling to put
their materials online.464
Therefore, by signing the WIPO treaties Congress intended to
provide these industries with the tools to protect their copyrighted
works from unauthorized exploitation within not only the United
States, but also within the countries that would ratify the trea-
ties.4 65 Congress was further motivated to sign and ratify the
WIPO treaties because they believed that, "the [treaties] largely
incorporate[d] intellectual property norms that [were] already part
457. At the time, it had accomplished $60.18 billion in foreign sales and exports.
Id.
458. See supra note 65-90 and accompanying text.
459. See supra Part.II.c.
460. See supra note 212-14 and accompanying text.
461. See supra Part.II.c.
462. Dam, supra at note 439, at 401; supra note 91-142 and accompanying text.
463. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt.l., at 9 (1998).
464. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 65 (1998); see also Real Networks, Inc. v. Streambox,
Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000)
(stating that "[m]any of these copyright owners further state if users could circumvent
the security measures and make unauthorized copies of the content, they likely would
not put their content up on the Internet for end-users").
465. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 65.
192
FAIR USE AND INFORMATION
of U.S. law."'466 The only major change needed was the enactment
of legislation that would protect TPMs from circumvention and
maintain the integrity of rights management systems.467
In response to intense criticism that § 1201's ban on trafficking
and additional violations provisions were too broad, Congress re-
sponded that the provisions were intended to apply only to "Black
Box" technology that were "primarily designed" to circumvent
TPMs placed by copyright owners to effectively protect their copy-
righted works.468 Hence, they claim that § 1201 was not directed
towards and does not apply to or deter other technological innova-
tions.469 Merely because a technological innovation has the effect
of circumventing TPMs alone does not constitute a violation of
these prohibitions.47 ° In addition, Congress asserted that these
laws are not novel or unprecedented.47 a Similar laws had already
been enacted in the music, cable, and satellite industries as a re-
sponse to technology that posed a significant threat to these indus-
tries' development and existence.472 Congress also acknowledged
that prohibiting the circumvention of copyrighted works may possi-
bly threaten, "the diminution of otherwise lawful access to works
and information, [thereby, requiring] a 'fail safe' mechanism. ' 473
The fail safe mechanism that Congress provided was the rule mak-
ing procedure.474
Accordingly, commentators who support Congress' passage of
§ 1201 argue that it will not detrimentally affect fair use and the
466. Id. (quoting Secretary Daly of the Department of Commerce). Clinton's NII
Task Force Report was well aware of the potential affect that anti-circumvention
prohibitions would have on fair use, and responded by asserting that the fair use "doc-
trine does not require a copyright owner to allow or to facilitate unauthorized access
or use of a work." THE WHITE PAPERS, supra note 208, at 231; see also Bell, supra
note 91, at 572 (discussing the affect of automated rights management and contractual
licensing on fair use).
467. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 65.
468. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b) (2001).
469. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt.l., at 10 (1998); Dam, supra note 439, at 401.
470. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt.l., at 10; Dam, supra note 439, at 401. These provi-
sions will apply only to technology that:
[is] primarily designed to grant free, unauthorized access to copyrighted
works; (2) have only limited commercially significant purpose or use other
than to grant such free access; or (3) are intentionally marketed for use in
granting such free access.
H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt.l., at 10.
471. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 28; H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt.l., at 10.
472. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 28; H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt.l., at 10.
473. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt.2., at 36.
474. Supra note 256-59 and accompanying text.
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copyright balance.475 Although they acknowledge that the tradi-
tional notion of fair use may be a thing of the past, they assert that
similar to technology and copyright law, fair use must also change
to adapt to new technology.476 These commentators claim that
§ 1201's exorbitant amount of criticism of is not directed at the pos-
sibility that there will be less information available to the public,
but merely that such information will no longer be free.477 They
also claim that digitized fair use or "fared use," as Professor Bell
refers to it, will provide many new benefits to users and the public
that were traditionally unavailable.478
Professor Bell and other commentators who support § 1201 as-
sert that the majority of commentators who decry the end of fair
use and copyright's private-public balance base their entire argu-
ments on the normative misconception that in a "pay-per-use
world" information will no longer be free.47 9 This misconception,
however, fails to take into consideration that even if there have
been no monetary costs, there have always been costs in the form
of transaction costs and lost opportunities. 480 Transaction costs and
lost opportunities are important because according to Coase's the-
orem, if transaction costs are high there will be less productivity
and dissemination of information.481 If all transaction costs are
abolished, however, then "the market would internalize all costs
and allow only value-maximizing transfers. ' 482 Therefore, they
claim that opponents of § 1201 fail to consider that although tradi-
tional fair uses have no monetary charge, they have many transac-
tion and lost opportunity costs. 483 Whereas, the use of information
in a pay-per-use world has few, if any, transaction or lost opportu-
nity costs, and any monetary costs are for the service and conve-
475. See Bell, supra note 91, at 579-92 (describing the advent of fared use and its
advantages); Dam, supra note 439, at 404-07, 411-12 (discussing some benefits of
trusted systems); Stefik, supra note 19, at 156-58 (asserting the possibility of digital
trusted systems functioning within copyright law through the aid of special
commissions).
476. Bell, supra note 91, at 569-70.
477. Id.; Dam, supra note 439, at 394, 410; Stefik, supra note 19, at 146-47.
478. Bell, supra note 91, at 600; Dam, supra note 439, at 404-407, 411-12; Stefik,
supra note 19, at 147-53.
479. Bell, supra note 91, at 558-59; Dam, supra note 439, at 393 n.1.
480. Dam supra note 439, at 412; Stefik, supra note 19, at 144-45.
481. See generally Bell, supra note 91, at 583; R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 193 (1960); Dam, supra note 439, at 408.
482. Bell, supra note 91, at 583.
483. Id. at 579-80.
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nience of superior quality information. 484 Furthermore, although
copyright's goal is the creation and dissemination of thoughts and
ideas to as broad a population as possible they claim that, "it is not
clear that [this] means that the copyright owner should be under a
greater obligation to facilitate copying or even to avoid steps to
make copying harder just because some user may be a fair user. "485
These commentators also rely on recent case law, American Ge-
ophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc. 4 8 6 and Princeton University Press v.
Michigan Document Services, Inc.4 8 7 to support their assertion that
users are not always entitled to unlimited, absolute, or free fair
uses.488 These cases narrowed fair use by holding that users are not
entitled to exploit copyrighted works for free for traditional fair
use purposes, such as research and education, when the copyright
owner has created a market for such uses and makes it feasible to
pay for such uses.48 9 Therefore, they assert that it logically follows
that in a digital pay-per-use world where copyright owners condi-
484. Id. at 580-81. Traditionally, if a user wanted several pages of information
about a relevant subject he would have to go to the library, search and find a source,
and then photocopy the relevant pages. Although the only monetary charges were
the photocopying fees, because the entire process would take two to four hours, he
incurred many transaction and lost opportunity costs. Whereas, in a pay-per-world
while the user may have to pay more than just the photocopying fees because all
information will be digitized, the entire process will take only several minutes and can
be done from any personal computer connected to the Web. See id. (discussing how
digital technology will improve and make more efficient the use of copyrighted
works).
485. Dam, supra note 439, at 409.
486. 60 F.3d 913, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that "the right to seek payment for
a particular use tends to become legally cognizable under the fourth fair use factor,
[the affect on the copyright owner's market,] when the means for paying for such a
use is made easier"). In this case, eighty three publishers of scientific and technical
journals sued Texaco for copyright infringement based on Texaco's copying and
archiving articles so that they could be later used for research purposes. Id. at 914-15.
The Second Circuit held that the copying was not considered fair use because the
publishers had set up a system to make easy payment through the Copyright Clear-
ance Center. Id. at 930-31.
487. 99 F.3d 1381, 1385-87 (6th Cir. 1996) (Holding that where the copyright holder
has an interest in exploiting a licensing market and has succeeded in doing so it is
appropriate that the potential licensing revenues be considered in a fair use analysis).
In this case, Princeton University Press and other publishers sued the defendant for
making unauthorized copies of their copyrighted material in creating coursepacks for
university students. Id. at 1383-84. The Sixth Circuit held that it was not fair use
because plaintiffs had successfully created a market for such use, which defendants
could have used, even though it would have taken up to four weeks to get permission.
Id.
488. Bell, supra note 91, at 567-75; Dam, supra note 439, at 410-12; Stefik, supra
note 19, at 145-46.
489. Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1385-88; Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at
930-31.
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tion the exploitation of all fair and non-fair uses on a trivial
price,49° neither fair use nor the copyright balance will be hindered
or diminished.4 91
These commentators assert that even a digital pay-per-use world
such as that envisioned by Professor Stefik, where all copyrighted
works are protected and managed by TPMs,4 92 will be more benefi-
cial to both copyright owners and users493 even if it shifts the bal-
ance and puts more power in the publishers' hands.494 First, they
claim TPMs will enable copyright owners to create entirely digital
libraries without the fear of rampant infringement.495 Second,
TPMs would provide copyright owners with attribution and integ-
rity rights that can be very important in maintaining their work's
legitimacy and authenticity.496 These benefits, among others, will
increase the value copyrighted works, which will encourage copy-
right owners to further create and disseminate.497 The decrease in
transaction costs will significantly increase transactional efficiency,
which will provide users with cheaper access to copyrighted
works.498 Furthermore, the digitalization of information content
will make copyrighted works more organized and of better
quality.499
These commentators also claim that the implementation of
TPMs may actually spread, rather than hinder ideas.500 Foremost,
TPM's automation and ability to provide fair uses for a certain
price will make fair use claims clear and precise, allowing users to
490. These commentators envision a world in which copyright owners will imple-
ment TPMs in trusted systems that make it very easy to make payments for all uses
including fair uses such as quoting, citing, parody, and satire. Bell, supra note 91, at
576-77; Dam, supra note 439, at 403-05; Stefik, supra note 19, at 145-47.
491. See Bell, supra note 91, at 579-90; Dam, supra note 439, at 409-10; Stefik, supra
note 19, at 146-52 (describing how DRLs will affect fair use).
492. Stefik, supra note 19, at 145-55.
493. Bell, supra note 91, at 580-81; Dam, supra note 439, at 405-06; Stefik, supra
note 19, at 146-53.
494. Stefik, supra note 19, at 155. Professor Stefik, however, claims that an uncon-
trolled digital pay-per-use world would shift the balance totally towards users, thus
abolishing the copyright balance. Id.
495. Id. at 147-49.
496. Dam, supra note 439, at 405-06. TPMs can ensure that a copyright owner's
work has not been tampered, altered, or modified, which may ruin their work's repu-
tation. See id. (discussing how TPMs will maintain an author's integrity and moral
rights).
497. Bell, supra note 91, at 589.
498. Id. at 586-88; see also Dam, supra note 439, at 409 (discussing how self-help
systems will make payment and the use of copyrighted works more efficient).
499. Bell, supra note 91, at 581, 589.
500. Dam, supra note 439, at 409.
FAIR USE AND INFORMATION
use and reuse materials without the fear of infringement and liabil-
ity.5"1 The lack of fear of liability and infringement claims will also
encourage public discourse because individuals will be more likely
to criticize, comment, and parody all types of views and sources.5 °2
Finally, commentators claim that because digitization and the use
of TPMs will encourage more copyrighted works whose copyright
terms will eventually expire, such works will ultimately fall into the
public domain, thereby, significantly expanding it.50 3
They also assert that fair use is not in danger because there are
many forces that will ensure that fair use is not restricted or annihi-
lated.5 "4 Courts will always monitor and make sure that fair use is
maintained.0 5 There are also many other safeguards, such as the
free market,50 6 First Amendment advocates,50 7 and civil disobedi-
ence through the public and mass media.50 8 Although these com-
mentators claim that the copyright balance will be maintained by
the many benefits that TPMs will provide, this claim is, however,
based on the assumption that contractual licensing will not impede
or restrain their ability to coexist and benefit fair use.5 9
2. UCC-2B/UCITA as the Real Danger to Fair Use and the
Copyright Balance
Although many commentators claim that the DMCA's § 1201
and copyright owners' use of TPMs will adversely affect fair use
and other privileges,510 this problem is not contained in a vacuum.
There is also a strong consensus among commentators who con-
tend that the copyright balance is in danger of being disrupted by
501. Bell, supra note 91, at 586-88.
502. See Stefik, supra note 19, at 150-51 (asserting that digital technology will en-
courage and facilitate use and reuse).
503. Bell, supra note 91, at 589-90. Professor Stefik envisions the public domain
increasing either through publishers providing free access once their copyright term
expires, which may be unlikely, or by copyright owners providing the Library of Con-
gress with a copy of their work. Stefik, supra note 19, at 152-53
504. Bell, supra note 91, at 578-79, 592, 601; Stefik, supra note 19, at 156.
505. Bell, supra note 91, at 578-79.
506. They claim that if a copyrighted work is obtained only through restrictive limi-
tations users will not buy the product and copyright holders will lose money. Id. at
601; Stefik, supra note 19, at 156. In addition, if copyrighted works are cheaply availa-
ble this will also discourage circumvention and unauthorized exploitation. Bell, supra
note 91, at 601; Stefik, supra note 19, at 156.
507. Bell, supra note 91, at 592.
508. Id. at 593.
509. Bell, supra note 91, at 560-65, 577-79; Dam, supra note 439, at 393-95; see also
Stefik, supra note 19, at 146, 151 (describing exclusive rights' limitations).
510. Supra Part.II.A.1.
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the precedent set forth in ProCD v. Zeidenberg and its progeny,
UCITA.511 UCITA stands to hinder fair use and the copyright bal-
ance because it legitimizes shrink-wrap like contracts that allow
copyright owners to evade copyright law while reaping all its bene-
fits.5 12 Thus, unlike TPMs, which offset the stronger protection by
providing greater benefits to the public UCITA provides copyright
owner with extensive protection and rights with very few benefits
to the public.513
Commentators' main problem with contractual licensing of digi-
tal information, 514 "shrink-wrap" contracts,515 UCITA516 is that
they will have the effect of destroying the balance that copyright
intended to create and maintain.51 7 These commentators contend
that copyright law and its delicate balance between copyright own-
ers' private interests and users' public interests was created in ac-
cordance with the utilitarian5 18 concept of copyright law rather
than the Natural Rights519 view.5 2° They support this distinction by
pointing to the fact that copyright law provides copyright owners
with limited exclusive rights only;521 yet, these rights are sufficient
enough to provide them with the incentive to further create and
disseminate.522 Moreover, copyright law offsets copyright owners'
511. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Symposium: Copyright Owner's Rights and User's
Privileges on the Internet: Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and Online Licenses, 22
DAYTON L. REV. 511, 512-13 (1996) (discussing how the proposed UCC-2B must be
preempted by Copyright law because it is provides copyright owners the right to force
users to contract away all their rights, thereby creating an unbalanced copyright sys-
tem); Mark A. Lemley, Symposium: Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intel-
lectual Property Licensing Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual
Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 113 (1999) (discussing the dangers that
UCC-2b poses and possible defenses); Madison, supra note 73, at 1026-31.
512. Supra note 190-96 and accompanying text.
513. Supra Part I.C.3.b.
514. Supra note 65-76 and accompanying text.
515. Although contractual licensing of digital information takes many other forms
such as "browser-wraps" and "click-wraps" for the purpose of convenience they are
referred to as "shrink-wrap" contracts for the remainder of this Note. See supra notes
165-166 and accompanying text (discussing the different type of electronic contracts).
516. Supra notes 169-204 and accompanying text.
517. Karjala, supra note 511, at 514-15.
518. Supra note 430 and accompanying text.
519. Supra note 411 and accompanying text.
520. Karjala, supra note 511, at 514-15.
521. Supra note 231 and accompanying text.
522. Karjala, supra note 511, at 517-18. Professor Lemley provides three reasons
why copyright law does not provide copyright owners with exclusive rights:
First, granting exclusive rights raises the cost of new works to the public, and
in some cases means that the public won't get access to the works at all.
Second, granting property rights to original creators allows them to prevent
subsequent creators from building on their works, which means that a law
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rights with various limitations that in turn provide the public with
many exceptions and privileges.523
In addition to asserting that it is uncontested that copyright law
contains this balance, they also maintain that the balance is unal-
terable and non-negotiable.524 They contend that the copyright
balance is not a default position, which can be negotiated and al-
tered by parties through agreement because of the explicit and in-
herent limitations placed upon copyright owners' exclusive
rights 525 Rather, they argue that these limitations are the means
provided by copyright law to adjust the balance. 26 Therefore, if
the Framers of the Constitution had intended to make these limita-
tions negotiable, the copyright balance would be superfluous be-
cause copyright owners who have higher bargaining power would
be able to bargain away all or a substantial part of these limita-
tions.527 Hence, the ability to bargain away rights and privileges
destroys the copyright balance and its utilitarian founding by pro-
viding copyright owners with all the benefits of copyright law, with-
out any offset or benefit to the public that have traditionally
accrued from free and fair use of information.5 28 This effect would
also be inconsistent with the constitutional Founders' intent to pro-
vide copyright owners with a limited right only. 9
Accordingly, contractual licensing of digital information has the
potential to upset the copyright balance. The main reason com-
mentators fear this outcome is that, "[in] the digital future, access
to many works may be available only to people who 'contract' in
advance [to many restrictions that are contrary to public policy] ...
designed to encourage the creation of first-generation works may actually
risk stifling second-generation creative works. Third, the goal of intellectual
property is only to provide the "optimal incentive," not the largest incentive
possible.
Lemley, supra note 511, at 124-25.
523. Karjala, supra note 511, at 517-19; supra note 317 and accompanying text. It is
this attempt to design a system that will provide copyright owners with the incentive
to create, offset by providing users with many exceptions and privileges, that gives
form to copyright's intricate balance.
524. Karjala, supra note 511, at 518; Lemley, supra note 511, at 125-26; Madison,
supra note 73, at 1078.
525. Karjala, supra note 511, at 518-19; Madison, supra note 73, at 1079; see also
supra note 231.
526. Madison, supra note 73, at 1079.
527. Karjala, supra note 511, at 521; Lemley, supra note 511, at 125-26.
528. Karjala, supra note 511, at 521. This notion implies that even if users are will-
ing to bargain away all or most of their privileges in exchange for either access or a
cheaper price they should not be allowed to do so because the policy implications of
eroding the copyright balance are too great. Id. at 519.
529. Lemley, supra note 511, at 125-26.
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[if] these 'licenses' are uniformly enforceable, all of the users'
rights of copyright will soon disappear. ' 530 They claim this fear is
not unfounded since many contracts written by copyright owners
attempt to privately regulate or bargain for greater rights than
those provided in the Copyright Act.531 For instance, many copy-
right owners attempt to restrict copying,532 fair use,533 reverse engi-
neering, 534 first sale doctrine, 535 public performance or displays,536
530. Karjala, supra note 511, at 513. The restrictions that are deemed "contrary to
public policy" are not quoting, citing, criticizing, or using any factual information or
ideas. Id. Shrinkwrap contracts seem to hinder information spillover, which Profes-
sor Gilson believes is essential to the furtherance and success of creation and dissemi-
nation of copyrighted works, because if copyright owners are contractually restricted
from using certain elements then they are limited and restricted from creating and
disseminating. Gilson, supra note 297, at 595, 601-02.
531. Lemley, supra note 511, at 128, 131; see also Bell, supra note 91, at 579, 597
(stating that absent contractual licensing fair use will maintain its balance).
532. Besides implicating fair use issues, if the copyrighted work is a computer pro-
gram it may be inconsistent with 17 U.S.C. § 117, which provides users with the right
to copy and adapt the program in order to properly utilize it and for archival pur-
poses. Vault Corp v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding
that Section 117 authorized defendant to make a copy of plaintiff's software in order
to test and analyze it); Lemley, supra note 511, at 128, 130. But see MAI Sys. Corp. v.
Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that "[s]ince MAI
licensed its software, the Peak customers do not qualify as 'owners' of the software
and are not eligible for protection under § 117").
533. See, e.g., RICK FEINBERG, PECULIAR PATENTS: A COLLECTION OF UNUSUAL
AND INTERESTING INVENTIONS FROM THE FILES OF THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE iV
(1994) (stating "No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, except by a
newspaper or magazine reviewer who wishes to quote brief passages in connection
with a review."). In addition, IBM's InfoMarket Service, a commercial TPM, contains
a restriction that states, "Unless IBM specifies otherwise, you may not copy, modify,
create derivative works based upon, adapt, reproduce, [or] translate ... any aspect of
this service." Bell, supra note 91, at 577 n.98.
534. Lemley, supra note 511, at 130. It is not hard to imagine a computer program
that provides in its end user agreement that the use of the program constitutes an
agreement not to reverse engineer the program.
535. Id. at 131. The first sale doctrine entitles the "owner of a particular copy or
phonorecord lawfully made..., or any person authorized by such owner.., to sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord." (emphasis added).
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2001). This limitation makes explicit that the copyright owner's
first sale extinguishes her right to public distribution of that copy. Id. The owner of
that particular copy, however, is still subject to the copyright owner's other exclusive
rights, specifically the right to reproduce and perform. Id. § 106. Since this exemp-
tion is only applicable to "owners" of copyrighted works individuals that acquire them
through leases, licenses, or rentals may not transfer or dispose of the work without the
copyright owner's permission. Id.. § 109(b)(1)(A). This limitation to the first sale doc-
trine also applies to sound recordings and computer programs lent or disposed for the
"direct or indirect commercial advantage." Id. Accordingly, this "ownership" loop-
hole has motivated and encouraged copyright owners to increasingly distribute their
works as licenses rather than as a transfer of title using contractual measures such as
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transfer rights,5 37 terms of ownership, 538 and most importantly the
public domain.539 They acknowledge, however, that contracting
within the bounds and terms of copyright law is allowed and should
be enforceable.54 °
Due to the potential dangers that contractual licensing of infor-
mation content presents, Professor Karjala believes that Judge Eas-
terbrook's holding in ProCD v. Zeidenberg validating "shrink-
wrap" contracts was mistaken.541 He claims that Judge Easter-
brook was mistaken because he failed to recognize and to take into
consideration copyright balance's public interest and how "shrink-
wrap" contracts would affect it.542  Furthermore, by enforcing
"shrink-wrap" contracts Judge Easterbrook altered users' conven-
tional sense of what is deemed an appropriate use to mirror copy-
right owner's expectations.543 Most significantly, ProCD gives the
illusion that fair use and other limitations that create the copyright
balance are a question of purely private definition.544
Having concluded that "shrink-wrap" contracts pose a great dan-
ger to the spirit of copyright law and that Judge Easterbrook was
"shrink-wrap" and "click-wrap" contracts. THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 62, at
34-35, 178.
536. Lemley, supra note 511, at 131-32.
537. Id.
538. Lemley, supra note 511, at 132. The Copyright Act sets out in detail the spe-
cific ways in which works "made for hire" are created. Lemley, supra note 511, at 132;
see also § 204. For instance, it requires that all contracts be written. § 204.
539. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
540. See Lemley, supra note 511, at 135 (stating that parties can contractually agree
to remedies for copyright infringement); Madison, supra note 73, at 1079 (stating that
"private contract... may assign rights within, but not beyond the limits set by Con-
gress"). An example of contracting within the bounds of copyright law is agreeing in
advance as to the remedies that will be available to the respective parties in the event
of an infringement, such as, agreeing to waive the remedy of injunctive relief for a
better price. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1293 (1996)
(discussing the emergence of collective copyright agencies as a way to bargain within
copyright and its compulsory licenses). Another example is when access to an unpub-
lished, otherwise unavailable copyrighted work is made contingent on the agreement
that the user not use any of the underlying ideas. Karjala, supra note 511, at 513.
541. Karjala, supra note 511, at 521; see also ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1449.
542. Karjala, supra note 511, at 521. Professor Karjala believes that Judge Easter-
brook mistakenly held that merely because the subject matter was not copyrightable
defendants were free to do as they pleased with the database. Id. at 521-22. His main
contention is that he failed to take into consideration various factors such as the dif-
ference between a private contract between two individuals that may not have been
published and a mass market license of a published work, and whether the Supremacy
Clause would have invalidated the contract. Id.
543. Madison, supra note 73, at 1058-59.
544. Id. at 1059.
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mistaken in holding them enforceable, the majority of commenta-
tors opposed to UCITA claim that there are two main ways that
"shrink-wrap" contracts may be invalidated; preemption under ei-
ther § 301 of the Copyright Act54 5 or the Supremacy Clause. 546
Only the latter option, however, will have any possible impact on
shrink-wrap contracts' validation and enforcement.547
Preemption under § 301 of the Copyright Act appears at first
glance to remedy the "shrink-wrap" issue. The first prong of
§ 301 does not present a problem because "a work is [considered
copyrightable] subject matter if it is of a type covered by sections
102 and 103 of the Copyright Act, even if federal law denies pro-
tection to all or a part of a work in a particular case. '54 9 The sec-
ond prong, that the right to be preempted must be "equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright,"
however, is problematic.55 0 The problem arises because of the ease
by which a copyright owner can evade § 301's preemption.5 5 1 A
copyright owner can evade preemption by proving that his contrac-
tual or other rights contain an "extra element," which "changes the
545. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2001).
546. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
547. Karjala, supra note 511, at 531; Lemley, supra note 511, at 139-42; Madison,
supra note 73, at 1052, 1127.
548. Karjala, supra note 511, at 527.
549. Id. Sections 102 and 103 define what is considered copyright subject matter:
§103. Subject matter of copyright: Compilations and derivative works
(a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes
compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing pre-
existing material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of
the work in which such material has been used unlawfully.
§ 103.
§ 102. Subject matter of copyright: In general
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
§ 102.
550. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2001).
551. Karjala, supra note 511, at 527-28; Lemley, supra note 511, at 140; Madison,
supra note 73, at 1128-29.
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nature of the action [to make it] qualitatively different from a cop-
yright infringement claim. ' -52 Accordingly, shrink-wrap contracts
easily evade preemption by proving that the agreement was a bilat-
eral promise formed by bargaining and assent, which are extra ele-
ments since the Copyright Act does not require either. 3  In
addition, many commentators, including the drafters of UCITA,
believe that contract claims cannot be preempted because they are
intrinsically different from copyright law infringement claims; cop-
yright law creates rights against the world, whereas contract law
defines rights between two assenting parties 4.5 5  Even if contract
claims can in fact evade preemption, they claim that mass-market
licenses should be preempted because they lack a true bargain. 5
Preemption under the Supremacy Clause presents a better
chance against shrink-wrap contracts because it will preempt any
rights that "[stand] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and exe-
cution of the full purposes and objectives of-Congress. "556 Accord-
ing to the leading case Goldstein v. California, courts should
preempt any state contractual claim that attempts to regulate a
work that falls into the subject matter of copyright and frustrates
the purposes and objectives of Congress.5 57 Thus, shrink-wrap con-
tracts should be preempted because they stand to frustrate and
erode the basic federal copyright policy, that copyright owners'
rights are not exclusive, but are limited by various limitations.558 In
552. Expediters Int'l of Wash., Inc. v. Direct Line Cargo Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 995 F.
Supp. 468, 480-85 (D.N.J. 1998) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment
claiming that contract claims were preempted, citing ProCD); see also Lattie v.
Murdach, No. C-96-2524 MHP, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3558, at *16-17 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8
1997) (remanding to state court a breach of contract claim concerning public domain
material after applying the "extra element" standard); Karjala, supra note 511, at 527-
28; Lemley, supra note 511, at 140; Madison, supra note 73, at 1128-29. The "extra
element," however, must be real and cannot be fictitiously created through a statutory
label because this would allow states to instantly replace all of copyright law through
one legislative act. Karjala, supra note 511, at 528.
553. Karjala, supra note 511, at 527-28; Lemley, supra note 511, at 147-50; Madison,
supra note 73, at 1128-30. Under § 301, the minority standard approach, and the "pri-
vate legislation" argument, contract claims would be preempted by copyright law.
Madison, supra note 73, at 1129-30. Under the minority standard, "courts preempt
enforcement of a state contract law claim unless the claim requires proof of an ele-
ment that is both not required by the Copyright Act... and goes to a right or promise
that is beyond the scope of copyright holder's right enumerated in the Copyright
Act." Id. Under the "private legislation" argument, the Copyright Act will preempt
claims when they become so prevalent that users have no other choice. Id. at 1130.
554. Lemley, supra note 511, at 147.
555. Karjala, supra note 511, at 531-32.
556. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
557. Karjala, supra note 511, at 534.
558. Id. at 535, 541.
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practice, however, courts have been inconsistent in their decisions
regarding preemption under the Supremacy Clause. 9
Other commentators claim that, although preemption under the
Supremacy Clause is vital and may have an important effect since
UCITA will make shrink-wrap contracts more common, it is not
sufficient to resolve the entire issue. 560 They claim preemption
under the Supremacy Clause has many deficiencies. 61 First, the
clause is a strong and broad tool that can have the effect of pre-
empting an entire field of law from a particular subject.562 Due to
this overbroad possible effect, courts may be reluctant to use it to
preempt shrink-wrap contracts. 63 Furthermore, it may not be ef-
fective when the copyright issue is not statutory, but rather equita-
ble or implied from copyright's balance principle.564 Accordingly,
other remedies will have to attempt to invalidate shrink-wrap con-
tracts such as unconscionability 565 and copyright misuse.566
Consequently, these commentators oppose UCITA because it
stands to validate and enforce shrink-wrap contracts. They claim
that UCITA fundamentally changed contract law by expanding the
scope and power of contracts.567 They attribute these changes to
UCITA's broad definition of "license; ' 568 its application to almost
559. Lemley, supra note 511, at 143.
560. Id. at 145.
561. Id. at 145-67.
562. Id. at 145.
563. Id.
564. Id. at 145-46. Since these cases are unclear as to whether there is a conflict,
courts may be reluctant to preempt. Id. at 146.
565. Although this is an option, it has many deficiencies such as it is hardly used, it
is hard to implement, and ProCD has provided "shrink-wrap" contracts with a fool-
proof method of evading unconscionability. Lemley, supra note 511, at 151.
566. Id. at 151-58. Although the drafters of U.C.I.T.A. admitted that this may be a
potential limitation to "shrink-wrap" contracts, it will not cover all cases including
those dealing with state intellectual property law. Id. at 157.
567. Id. at 118-23.
568. Karjala, supra note 511, at 534-35. The major contention against this defini-
tion is that it changes the usual standard for determining whether a transaction was a
sale, license, or lease based on the "economic realities of the exchange." Lemley,
supra note 511, at 118-19; see also Karjala, supra note 511, at 534-35. Under UCITA
section 1(a)(41), anything that fits within this broad definition regardless of the "eco-
nomic realities of the exchange" is considered a license. Unif. Computer Info. Trans-
action Act § 1(a)(41) (Final Act Aug. 2002); Karjala, supra note 511, at 534-35;
Lemley, supra note 511, at 118-19. UCITA § 1(a)(41) states:
"License" means a contract that authorizes access to, or use, distribution,
performance, modification, or reproduction of, information or informational
rights, but expressly limits the access or uses authorized or expressly grants
fewer than all rights in the information, whether or not the transferee has
title to a licensed copy. The term includes an access contract, a lease of a
computer program, and a consignment of a copy. The term does not include
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all copyright subject matter because of its definition of "informa-
tion;' ' 569 the enforcement of a standard form contract with no true
bargain or assent;57 ° its property-like character that seems to be
more like an equitable servitude; 57 1 and, most significantly, that it
allows the contract drafters to enforce almost any terms they
choose.572
They also argue that UCITA codifies the argument and stan-
dards created by ProCD,573 which assures tlat it will reinforce
rather than suspend the growing norm in shrink-wrap contracts as
private bilateral restrictions on information use and distribution.574
UCITA strengthens and supports this growing trend in several
manners. It mandates that the control of use and reuse of "infor-
mation" be determined solely through contracts. 75 It enforces any
restrictions on transfers and makes any of the licensee's duties en-
forceable on any and all future assignees. 5 76 Hence, in effect it
makes the contractual terms' rights effective against the world, not
merely between the two agreeing parties. Finally, it has the poten-
tial to allow copyright owners the right to restrict the use of ideas,
facts, and fair use of their works, which would also be binding
against the entire world.577
a reservation or creation of a security interest to the extent the interest is
governed by [Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code].
Unif. Computer Info. Transaction Act. § 1(a)(41) (Final Act Aug. 2002).
569. Madison, supra note 73, at 1124-26. UCITA § 1(a)(35) defines information as,
"data, text, images, sounds, mask works, or computer programs, including collections
and compilations of them." Unif. Computer Info. Transaction Act § 1(a)(35) (Final
Act Aug. 2002).
570. Professor Lemley believes that UCITA has this affect because it considers the
terms part of a contract if the buyer manifests assent, which includes using informa-
tion already bought, or by having been given prior notice. Lemley, supra note 511, at
118-22, 120 n.19.
571. Id. at 121.
572. Id. at 121-23.
573. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F.Supp 640, 650-58 (W.D. Wis. 1996); supra
Part I.C.3.
574. Madison, supra note 73, at 1127.
The Draft thus (i) validates 'mass-market' license terms that are not 'uncon-
scionable,' (ii) allows negotiated licenses to take precedence over mass-mar-
ket license terms, and (iii) imposes a mandatory refund option for mass-
market license terms that cannot be accessed or reviewed before the user
pays for the 'information.' This is the contract framework applied by the
court in ProCD.
Id.
575. Karjala, supra note 511, at 535; see also Unif. Computer Info. Transaction Act
§ 208 (Final Act Aug. 2002).
576. Karjala, supra note 511, at 535; see also Unif. Computer Info. Transaction Act
§ 506 (Final Act Aug. 2002).
577. Karjala, supra note 511, at 536.
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Consequently, UCITA has the potential to disrupt copyright's
delicate balance because it does not provide the ability to opt-out
of copyright law.578 Rather, UCITA provides copyright owners
with the right to combine copyright and contract laws that would
disproportionately place the power of the court in their favor.579
Since copyright owners would have ultimate control over what is
enforceable, the main fear is that users will suffer by being bound
to a contractual copyright law that provides them with barely any
privileges.
Il. ABSENT SHRINKWRAP CONTRACTS THE DMCA WILL
PROVIDE A DIGITIZED FAIR USE AND MAINTAIN THE
COPYRIGHT BALANCE
The emergence of digital technology and the Web has revolu-
tionized the world in every aspect of our lives from how we sleep,
eat, learn, listen to music, watch TV, read books, and even commu-
nicate. In every field in which it has been embodied in, it has pro-
vided immense benefits and advantages to the public. Therefore,
although § 1201 may provide copyright owners with greater protec-
tion and control, copyright's balance is preserved by the offset in
benefits and advantages that digital technology provides.5 80 The
real peril to fair use and copyright's balance, however, emanates
from the NCCUSL's enactment of UCITA rather than from the
DMCAS a UCITA poses a tremendous danger to fair use and cop-
yright's balance because it provides copyright owners with unlim-
ited control over and beyond copyright law, without providing any
benefits to the public. 582
Copyright law has traditionally been sufficiently able to deal
with unauthorized exploitation and piracy to the extent that it pre-
vented significant damage to copyright owners. 583 Digital technol-
ogy, however, is so novel that traditional copyright law was
insufficiently structured to deal with all its legal implications. 584 It
is primarily because of copyright's inadequacy that TPMs play a
vital role in the digital revolution by allowing copyright owners to
578. Supra Part II.l.c.
579. Lemley, supra note 511, at 150.
580. Supra note 493-504 and accompanying text.
581. Supra Part II.B.2.
582. Supra note 578-80 and accompanying text.
583. See supra note 69-76 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of
digital information).
584. See supra note 69-76 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of
digital information).
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protect their works from unauthorized exploitation and piracy.585
TPMs, however, are not impenetrable and with patience and skill
can be circumvented. 586
Although some commentators espouse the view that the modern
market and TPMs provide copyright owners with sufficient ability
to protect themselves;587 WIPO, 588 Congress, 589 and former Presi-
dent Clinton's National Information Infrastructure Task Force's
Working Group on Intellectual Property590 correctly believed that
new legislation was required "to [bring] copyright law squarely into
the digital age. '' 591 They were also correct in declaring that, if cop-
yright law was not updated to recognize and accommodate digital
information content, it would have detrimental consequences.
592
Copyright's inadequacy would prevent the further economic suc-
cess of these industries, and it would hinder the advancement and
growth of digital technology.593 Yet, most importantly, it would
hinder the growth of digital copyrighted works and their dissemina-
tion on the Web because of the unanimous fear that any digital
works disseminated on the Web would be susceptible to unautho-
rized exploitation and piracy.594
The DMCA's § 1201 is necessary not only to protect copyright
owners from unauthorized exploitation and piracy, but also to en-
sure that copyright owners continue to create and disseminate
works so that the public can fully benefit from the digital revolu-
tion. Although commentators oppose § 1201 for various rea-
sons,595 their main contention is that it would have the adverse
effect of hindering or diminishing fair use and copyright's
balance.596
To the contrary, § 1201 does not adversely affect fair use or cop-
yright's balance. The arguments declaring that § 1201 will ad-
versely affect fair use and copyright's balance are erroneous for
one compelling reason. These arguments' reasoning are based on
585. Supra Part I.C.2.d.
586. Supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
587. Supra Part II.A.3.
588. Supra notes 8, 14, 212-14 and accompanying text.
589. Supra note 58-59, 217, 463-74 and accompanying text.
590. Supra note 206-11 and accompanying text.
591. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998).
592. Supra note 452-57 and accompanying text.
593. Supra note 452-57 and accompanying text.
594. Supra note 452-57 and accompanying text.
595. Supra Part II.A.
596. Supra Part II.A.1.
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mainly two incorrect normative assumptions.597 This is significant
because the use of these incorrect normative assumptions as their
arguments' axioms will always lead to the conclusion that § 1201 or
any other major change in copyright law will adversely effect fair
use and copyright's balance.
The first incorrect normative assumption is the presupposition
that copyright owners and Congress have a duty to provide not
only access for fair use purposes, but also provide it for free.598 It is
important to realize that fair use is not a right or entitlement, as
some commentators either mistakenly or intentionally have
stated.599 Rather, fair use is merely a privilege. This distinction is
very important because if fair use were a right then copyright own-
ers and Congress would indeed have a legal duty to provide fair
use to the public. Since it is only a privilege, neither copyright
owners nor Congress have a duty to affirmatively provide it. Fur-
thermore, these commentators seem to assume that the public has
a right to free fair use because it has traditionally been free to the
public.6"' This misconception is a result of the inadequacies of
traditional analog mediums, such as books, magazines, and photo-
graphs to prevent copyright infringements.
The second incorrect normative assumption is that copyright
owners cannot prevent or prohibit access to their copyrighted
works or make copying or other fair uses harder to accomplish.6 1
This incorrect assumption is also a misconception caused by soci-
ety's predominant norms and beliefs as to what uses the public is
entitled to under copyright law and why they are entitled to such
uses. 602 For instance, many individuals believe that copyright own-
ers cannot prevent an individual from photocopying their book,
magazine, or pictures. Since most individuals have been able to
freely do this their entire lives, they erroneously perceive TPMs
that prevent this ability as taking away a right that they have al-
ways had. This is exactly where the misconception lies. The public
does not realize that throughout most of our lives we have been
infringing upon other people's copyright by either photocopying,
videotaping, quoting, even by using a computer to browse the
597. Supra Part II.A.1.
598. Supra note 468-85 and accompanying text.
599. See supra note 485 and accompanying text (stating that copyright owners do
not have an obligation to make fair use easier).
600. Supra note 468-85 and accompanying text.
601. Supra note 468-85 and accompanying text.
602. Supra note 468-85 and accompanying text.
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Web.6"3 Although some of these infringements are exempt from
liability by privileges such as fair use when they are vital to further-
ing the Copyright Clause's policy of promoting education and pro-
gress of the arts;60 4 many others, such as photocopying, were never
intended to be a privilege. Rather, these uses were considered an
inevitable loss that were incidental to the use of analog materials
such as books, which copyright owners could not do anything to
curtail.
Accordingly, once these misconceptions are taken into consider-
ation, it is not hard to realize that a pay-per-use world as envi-
sioned by commentators that oppose § 1201 is very unlikely to
occur.60 5 Although, the details of the vision may provide a glimpse
into the future, in practice the pay-per-use world will not adversely
affect fair use. First, as previously explained, a copyright owner
has no duty to provide the public with free access for fair use pur-
poses or to make a specific fair use.60 6 In addition, individuals fail
to realize that in this digital pay-per-use world there will no longer
be many transaction and lost opportunity costs that plague the ana-
log world. 60 7 Thus, although an individual may have to pay a cer-
tain amount, most likely less than the analog version for access or
to partake in fair use of a copyrighted work, this monetary cost will
most likely be less than that of the prior transaction and lost oppor-
tunity costs. 608
Nevertheless, even if a TPM protected by § 1201 would condi-
tion the use of the copy, paste, save, or other function on some
monetary cost or explicitly prohibit quoting, citing, or copying, it is
hard to imagine how absent contractual conditions this hinders fair
use. TPMs are only able to control access and use of the copy-
righted works. 609 Therefore, a user would still be able to cite,
quote, and copy once they had paid for access by using traditional
means such as writing it down, retyping the text, taking a picture of
the screen with a digital or analog camera, or using an external
recorder to record audio from the speakers. If they prefer to make
their fair use more convenient and of better quality, then they
would have to pay the amount that the copyright owner requires.
603. Supra note 66-76 and accompanying text.
604. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001)
605. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the advent of a pay-per-use world).
606. Supra note 598-602 and accompanying text.
607. Supra fhote 480-85 and accompanying text.
608. See supra note 480-85 and accompanying text (discussing the decrease in trans-
action costs caused by digital information).
609. See supra Part I.C.2.d (discussing TPMs available to copyright owners).
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This illustration make clear that, although in a pay-per-use world
there may be a monetary cost to each use including fair uses, this
monetary cost will be an option only for those users that desire to
obtain a better quality and more convenient alternative, a "fared
use" as Professor Bell refers to it.610 .
Moreover, the realization of a pay-per-use world would not de-
stroy or make asymmetrical copyright's balance.611 Although
TPMs, in conjunction with § 1201, provide copyright owners with
unprecedented power and control,612 this does not necessarily
mean that copyright's balance has been disproportionately
thwarted. Copyright's balance is maintained because through the
implementation and protection of TPMs the public stands to signif-
icantly benefit.613
Foremost, as Coase's theorem asserts,614 the lowering of transac-
tion .costs will have the inevitable effect of increasing production of
copyrighted works.1 This increased production through the me-
dium of the Web will provide for greater creation and dissemina-
tion of information than remotely possible in the analog world.616
In addition, because all copyright owners will be able to produce
quantitatively more works at lower transaction costs, the market
factors along with competition will provide the public with cheaper
access. 61 7 This outcome, however, is directly dependent on § 1201
because if copyright owners' TPMs are not protected from circum-
vention, they will be severely discouraged from creating and pub-
lishing on the Web.618 The protection of copyrighted works will
also not have the effect that professor Gilson asserts as Massachu-
setts' Route 128's demise 61 9 because the sharing of ideas and inven-
tions and Silicon Valley's success is a factor that copyright
610. Supra note 478, 492-99 and accompanying text.
611. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing commentator's argument that digital fair use
will not affect the copyright balance, but actually benefit users and copyright owners).
612. See supra Part I.C.2.d (discussing TPMs available to copyright owners); supra
note I.C.4 (discussing § 1201's provisions).
613. Supra note 492-99 and accompanying text.
614. Supra note 481 and accompanying text.
615. See supra note 481-84, 500-03 and accompanying text (discussing transaction
costs and benefits of digital technology).
616. See supra note 500-03 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of digital
information).
617. See supra note 481-84 and accompanying text (discussing the decrease in trans-
action costs).
618. Supra note 452-64 and accompanying text.
619. Supra note 297 and accompanying text.
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supports.620 Alternatively, if copyright owners' decide to create
and disseminate, the price for these works will be much higher to
take into consideration losses from circumvention and piracy.
In addition to greater creation and dissemination of information,
a digital pay-per-use world will also provide many other benefits to
the public, such as better quality copyrighted works, greater selec-
tion, greater diversity, authenticity of works, and the ability to find
and access copyrighted works faster and easier.6 21
Section 1201's ban on trafficking and additional violations provi-
sions also do not sway copyright's balance towards copyright own-
ers. Contrary to the view that they are too broad and
nondiscriminatory because they apply to all uses alike,622 commen-
tators fail to consider that Congress intended them to apply only to
black box technology. 623 Therefore, if an individual somehow cir-
cumvents a TPM using technology that falls outside of the factors
identifying black box technology, then they would not be liable
under this provision.
Similarly, § 1201's Library Rule Making Procedure and excep-
tion for libraries and archives are not inadequate solely because
these provisions still apply. It is possible that an individual who
satisfied the Library of Congress' conditions who was then brought
to court for violation of these provisions may be relieved of liability
by the court. By applying § 1201's legislative intent, the court has
the ability to hold that Congress did not intend for that individual
to be liable-as long as he was not using black box technology. In
addition, although the library and archive exemption does not pro-
vide immunity from these provisions, as professor Benkler, asserts
it is most likely that publishers will provide libraries with the ability
to circumvent their TPMs because it will be economically benefi-
cial to them. 624
Although the First Amendment is a constitutional fundamental
right, the First Amendment/democratic paradigm's argument that
§ 1201 violates this fundamental right by diminishing or locking up
the public domain also does not withstand scrutiny. Foremost, as
620. Copyright's idea/expression dichotomy supports the Silicon Valley results be-
cause the information spill over that occurred did not involve copyrighted expression,
but merely ideas and inventions. Accordingly, the dissemination of this information
would have been encouraged by copyright law as promoting the progress of science.
621. See supra note 500-03 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of digital
information).
622. Supra note 302-05 and accompanying text.
623. Supra note 236-46 and accompanying text.
624. Supra note 392.
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professor Netanel asserted, even though TPMs in conjunction with
§ 1201 may provide copyright owners with an overabundance of
protection, the important factor is that this will cause an increase in
creation and dissemination.625 Accordingly, even though some in-
dividuals may not be able to make fair use of copyrighted works as
they have always had, this greater quantity and quality of work will
eventually fall into the public domain; thereby, increasing this great
source of speech.
Moreover, because copyright's idea/expression dichotomy, not-
withstanding contractual provisions, explicitly allows the free use
of copyrighted works' ideas and facts during the copyright term
and the copyrighted expression once the copyright terms has ex-
pired,626 § 1201 will greatly benefit the public domain. As profes-
sor Netanel, however, also addresses, the real threat to the public
domain may derive from our present copyright term that is unjusti-
fiably too long.62 7
Contrary to the market failure champions' assertions 628 the
proper resolution to § 1201 is not to provide copyright owners with
the ability to opt-out of copyright law and rely on common law
rights. This resolution is inappropriate because § 1201 does not
sway the copyright balance too unfavorably towards copyright
owners and because providing them with this right would have in
fact have the feared effect of distorting copyright's balance and re-
ducing access.
Copyright law was not created as a response to the market's fail-
ure to protect authors; it was created to promote education and the
arts in fulfillment of either the utilitarian vision or the democratic
paradigm. 629 Accordingly, if Congress enacted copyright law in
furtherance of the utilitarian vision as these commentators pro-
claim,63 ° it does not support their proposition because utilitarian-
ism is merely about producing the consequences that will provide
the greatest amount of benefit for the greatest amount of individu-
als and has nothing to do with rights.631 Hence, since by opting-out
of copyright law only the copyright owners would benefit, this
would not satisfy the utilitarian principle.
625. Netanel, supra note 17, at 298-99.
626. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2001); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-05 (1879).
627. Netanel, supra note 17, at 298-99.
628. Supra Part II.A.3.
629. Supra Part I.A.
630. Supra note 519-23 and accompanying text.
631. Supra note 430 and accompanying text.
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Commentators' fears for the future of fair use and the copyright
balance, however, are not unfounded, but rather misplaced. The
digital pay-per-use world as envisioned by Professors Stefik and
Dam, who have illustrated the many benefits it can provide, as well
as the adequacy of the ban on trafficking, additional violations pro-
visions, and § 1201's exceptions unfortunately rely on one impor-
tant, but erroneous assumption. a32  They presuppose that
contractual licensing will support "faired use" and the copyright
balance that the digital world will create.633 Therefore, the real
danger to fair use and copyright's balance stems from the adoption
of the UCITA.634
UCITA stands to adversely affect fair use and copyright's bal-
ance because a contractual license can condition access on the
user's agreement that he refrain from making traditional fair uses
as well as digital "fared uses.16 35 Additionally, unlike § 1201,
UCITA may prevent information spillover, which professor Gilson
credits as the cause of Silicon Valley's success.636 Since the infor-
mation spilling over was facts, ideas, and inventions, copyright law
could not restrict it, however, UCITA is not bound to copyright
law and can prohibit the use of facts, ideas, and inventions.
Although many proponents of UCITA may raise as a counter-
argument that copyright owners will not be able to enforce or no-
tice a breach of this provision, it is important to take into consider-
ation present and future TPMs. For instance, present TPMs such
as watermarks and webcrawlers have the ability to monitor the en-
tire Web, which in a digital pay-per-use world is the entire copy-
right world, in search of unauthorized uses.637 Thus, a contractual
license in conjunction with TPMs provides copyright owners with
the ability to self-enforce their restrictions and to partake in self-
help.638
Furthermore, besides providing copyright owners with the ability
to condition access to almost any restriction, UCITA makes mat-
ters worse by providing copyright owners with the ability to en-
force these restrictions in "shrink-wrap" contracts.63 9
632. Supra Part II.B.1.
633. Supra note 509 and accompanying text.
634. Supra Part II.B.2.
635. Supra note 530-40 and accompanying text.
636. Supra note 297 and accompanying text.
637. Supra Part I.C.2.d.iii.
638. See supra note 203-204 and accompanying text (discussing UCITA's self-help
provisions).
639. Supra note 510-13 and accompanying text.
2003]
214 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
Accordingly, unlike § 1201 and TPMs, UCITA provides copy-
right owners with unlimited power and control over their copy-
righted works without any limitations that may enable users to
partake in fair use. Most importantly, UCITA does not provide
any countervailing benefits to the public that can equalize the cop-
yright balance between copyright owners and the public.
CONCLUSION
As a result of the advancement of technology and the harms and
consequences that digital information can have on copyrighted
works and its industries Congress' enactment of the DMCA's
§ 1201 was necessary and vital. Due to its unprecedented approach
this legislation was not welcomed by legal scholars who claim that
it stands to hinder and possible abolish fair use and copyright's bal-
ance; that it will adversely affect the public domain and that it will
disproportionately sway protection in favor of copyright owners to
the detriment of the public. Contrary to these claims, the DMCA's
§ 1201 does not hinder fair use, copyright's balance, or the public
domain.
